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Abstract  
The gut is home to a great number of microbes. The immune system, to protect the body, 
must discriminate between the pathogenic and non-pathogenic microbes and respond to 
them in different ways. How the mucosal immune system manages to make this distinction 
is poorly understood. Here, we explore whether the decision to respond in a certain way to 
a microorganism is made by single types of cells and molecules or by the collective 
activity of various kinds of cells and molecules in a given anatomical compartment. As we 
shall see, single types of cells and single types of receptors can recognize and become 
activated by motifs common to both pathogenic and non-pathogenic agents. Indeed, we 
show here that the distinction between pathogenic and non-pathogenic microbes is made 
by an integrated system rather than by single types of cells or single types of receptors. 
Since immune recognition is constituted by a complex network of molecular and 
cellular level interactions, complete understanding of this process requires knowledge of 
these interactions. However, is it possible to explain immune recognition in molecular and 
cellular terms if this process is multiple realizable? Indeed, given the number and dynamics 
of elements involved in the recognition, it is hardly possible that their exact configuration 
could ever be reproduced even in the same individual.  
We argue that it is practically impossible to reduce immune recognition to its actual 
molecular and cellular realization. (This would require making reference to an infinitely 
long disjunction of lower level processes and each disjunct would be endlessly complex). 
Instead, the recognition is reducible to the approximation of molecular and cellular level 
processes. We suggest that the same strategy that was used by us to explain immune 
recognition in terms of lower level approximations is commonly applied by molecular 
biologists and systems biologists to explain complex biological processes. 
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Introduction 
In this thesis I investigate the problem of immune recognition in the gut and try to 
understand if this process can be explained, reductively, in terms of constituent cells and 
molecules and their interactions.  In this way I hope to shed light on certain aspects of 
explanatory practice in systems biology and immunology.   
 
The thesis consists of three parts: 
 In the first part, I propose that the immune system distinguishes a pathogen from a 
non-pathogen through the integration of "detection modules" that measure a 
number of parameters, such as the structure of the microbe, its position, alterations 
in the environment and the state of the host. I discuss the fact that single modules, 
such as recognition of microbial patterns, are not sufficient to discriminate 
pathogens from non-pathogens, as both types of microbe share many structures.  
 In the second part, an attempt is made to explain how defects in the complex 
recognition system described in the first part of the thesis can lead to chronic 
immune misrecognition in the form of inflammatory bowel disease (IBD). I suggest 
that IBD almost always involves coincident alterations in several detection modules 
because the architecture of immune recognition is robust and alterations in one 
detection module are often compensated by the activity of other modules. 
 In the third part of the thesis I try to understand if an explanation of immune 
recognition in terms its molecular and cellular parts and their complex interactions 
can succeed given heterogeneity of lower level realizers. There is a sense in which 
our explanation in terms of constituent modules and molecular and cellular parts of 
these modules can be considered as reductive. I suggest that one of the limitations 
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of this reductionist approach is that it is based on approximations of the molecular 
and cellular level processes rather than representations of the actual goings-on.   
 
Immune recognition 
According to the present conceptual framework in immunology, an immune reaction 
develops in three stages: recognition, decision making (tuning of the response) and the 
effector response. Although partially overlapping, each of these three steps involves 
characteristic cells in particular anatomical compartments (Pulendran et al. 2001). The 
ideas of “immune recognition”, “decision making” and “response” are metaphors (Tauber 
1997), but in non-metaphorical terms they refer to the early, intermediate and late stages of 
immune activation in reaction to different kinds of antigens or microorganisms. Each stage 
is believed to determine the following stage. Consequently, immune recognition can be 
identified with initial calibration of the immune response to an antigen or a microorganism. 
From this point of view, studies of immune recognition are in fact identical to studies of 
determinants of immune system response. Therefore, when we ask the question “how does 
the intestinal immune system recognize pathogenic bacteria?” we are really asking what 
determines that such-and-such responses are induced against these bacteria. 
It has been proposed that the determinants of the immune response are single types 
of cells and single types of receptors: epithelial cells, macrophages, dendritic cells, 
neutrophils, Toll-like receptors (TLRs), Nucleotide-binding oligomerization domain-like 
receptors (NOD-like receptors) or antigen receptors of B-cells and T-cells
1
. We contrast 
this classical reductionist view with a systemic view, according to which immune 
                                                          
1 For example, it is said that “Toll-like receptors (TLRs) expressed on immune cells trigger inflammatory responses” 
(Szajnik et al. 2009, p. 4353) or “[E]pithelial cells elicit inflammatory responses only against pathogenic bacteria that 
invade into the basolateral compartment from the apical side” (Takeda et al. 2003, p. 350) or “[M]ucosal [dendritic cells] 
DCs elicit innate effector responses that lead to secretion of distinct patterns of cytokines” (Iwasaki 2007, p. 399). 
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responses reflect the actual state of the immune system in a given environmental niche 
rather than being determined by single types of cells or molecules.  
In general, if the immune response towards a microorganism is non-inflammatory, it is 
said that the microorganism is recognized by the immune system as safe. If the immune 
response is inflammatory, it is said that the microorganism is recognized by the immune 
system as pathogenic (Akira et al. 2006). By studies of immune recognition, we mean an 
attempt to understand the cellular and molecular mechanisms leading to inflammatory or 
non-inflammatory responses to different kinds of stimuli. There are potentially two types 
of mechanisms that could be involved in immune recognition: 
 
1. A single type of receptor or a single type of cell performs immune recognition of a 
microorganism as pathogenic or safe. In this case, understanding immune 
recognition would rely upon studies of receptor activation or cell activation.  
2. Immune recognition of a microorganism as pathogenic or safe is performed by an 
integrated activity of molecules, receptors and cells in their environmental context. 
Thus understood, immune recognition cannot be explained at the level of single 
cells and molecules and instead requires reference to the joint action of cells and 
molecules.  
 
In the thesis an attempt is made to understand which of these two interpretations correctly 
represents the actual mechanism of immune recognition. Do single types of cells and 
receptors perform the recognition or is it performed by the whole immune system in a 
given context? Single types of cells and receptors have been proposed to act as sentinels: 
“Sentinel cells, including epithelial cells, luminal macrophages, and intraepithelial 
dendritic cells, continuously sense the environment and coordinate defenses for the 
protection of mucosal tissues” (Rumbo et al. 2004, p. 16). The sentinel concept implies that 
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certain types of immune cells discriminate between “friends” and “foes”. If a 
microorganism is pathogenic, it is recognized as being so first by epithelial cells, then by 
dendritic cells, then by macrophages, then by neutrophils and finally by B-cells and T-cells. 
In other words, the recognition of a given microbe is performed numerous times by 
numerous cells. But do immune cells really behave as solitary sentinels? 
We shall argue that it is necessary to zoom out to larger scales to understand 
immune recognition. In everyday contexts, zooming out means getting visual access to a 
broader area. The scale of the perceived objects is no longer in millimeters but in meters or 
even kilometers. This look from a distance often entails loss of attention to many details of 
the visual field. This is not the kind of zooming out we would like to achieve to understand 
immune recognition. We would like to zoom out without losing track of molecular and 
cellular details. Knowledge of these details and their role in the broader picture is needed 
to design molecular agents that could restore immune recognition to health. Thus, what we 
are looking for is a high resolution picture of the broad physiological area involved in the 
calibration of an immune response. The higher the resolution and the broader the picture 
the better the understanding of the recognition.  
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PART I 
 
Immune recognition as an integrated activity of 
cells and molecules 
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The healthy gut houses about 100 trillion (10
14
) microorganisms (Ley et al. 2006). 
Commensal gut microbes help digest complex polysaccharides, stimulate the development 
of the mucosal immune system and protect the body from pathogens (Hentschel et al. 
2003). However, when confronted with disease-causing microbes, the gut immune system 
can distinguish them from the commensals and mount a response that protects the host. 
Defects in the capacity of the mucosal immune system to discriminate between pathogenic 
and commensal microorganisms can cause pathology: On the one hand, non-inflammatory 
responses to pathogenic microbes can foster infection; on the other hand, inflammatory 
responses to non-pathogenic agents can damage the gut and lead to inflammatory bowel 
disease (IBD) (Podolsky 2002). The question of how the immune system manages to 
recognize pathogenic microbes is one of the most important issues of mucosal immunology. 
Here, we shall explore whether discrimination between pathogenic and commensal 
bacteria can be reduced to the level of single immune cells or whether this discrimination 
is performed by integrated cellular activities at the systems level.  
According to the classical view, this discrimination is performed by single types of cells or 
single types of molecules (Murphy et al. 2008, p. 48). This classical view is contrasted here 
with a context-sensitive view in which discrimination between pathogenic and non-
pathogenic microbes is the outcome of a complex exchange of information between 
various types of immune-system cells and non-immune cells (Cohen 2000a, p. 159-162; 
Cohen 2000b). 
 
Single types of cells and molecules cannot distinguish between pathogenic and non-
pathogenic microbes 
Two classes of innate receptors crucially involved in intestinal immune responses are Toll-
like receptors (TLRs) and Nucleotide-binding oligomerization domain-like receptors 
(NOD-like receptors) (Fritz and Girardin 2005). Both types of receptor molecules are 
18 
 
sometimes considered as sensors of pathogens. However, this idea faces empirical 
problems. There are at least 11 kinds of TLRs and all of them can become activated by 
motifs common to pathogenic and non-pathogenic microbes (Sandor and Buc 2005, p. 149). 
In addition, some of the TLRs can recognize the body’s own molecules such as fibrinogen 
or heat-shock protein (HSP). Consider TLR4: TLR4 recognizes lipopolysaccharide (LPS), 
a component of the cell walls of gram-negative bacteria, independently of whether these 
bacteria are pathogenic or not. In addition, TLR4 can become activated by self-motifs 
found in healthy vertebrates such as HSP60 (Cohen-Sfady 2009). TLR5, too, can recognize 
motifs found in both pathogenic and non-pathogenic agents. One of its ligands is flagellin, 
a protein expressed by attenuated as well as by pathogenic strains of Salmonella (Newton 
et al. 1989). TLR9 is stimulated by unmethylated repeats of the dinucleotide CpG, 
independently of whether they originate from pathogenic or commensal bacteria (Hemmi 
et al. 2000). More recently, it has been suggested that TLR9 recognizes DNA in a 
sequence-independent manner (Haas et al. 2008). It is clear that TLRs recognize and 
become activated by motifs common to pathogenic and commensal agents. In addition, the 
outcome of TLR ligation is subject to modulation in the intestine. The same type of TLR 
activated by the same type of ligand in the same type of cell can promote inflammatory or 
non-inflammatory type responses, depending on the context: “A problem with TLR 
agonists that has not been fully appreciated is that they can generate suppressive as well as 
inflammatory responses in innate immune cells and can promote the induction of 
regulatory as well as effector T cells” (Conroy et al. 2008, p. 168).  
            Another important class of innate immune receptors active in the intestine are 
NOD-like receptors (NLR). But they too appear to lack the power to discriminate between 
pathogenic and commensal microbes. The ligands of NOD1 and NOD2 are muramyl-
tripeptide and muramyl-dipeptide (MDP) that are components of bacterial peptidoglycan 
(PGN) (Girardin et al. 2003a; Girardin et al. 2003b). PGN is a constituent of the cell walls 
of both pathogenic and non-pathogenic, gram-positive and gram-negative bacteria (Guan 
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and Mariuzza 2007). Therefore NLRs, like TLRs, can become activated by intestinal 
agents independently of their commensal or pathogenic identity.  
Contrary to expectations, the antigen receptors of both B cells and T cells lack the 
capacity to distinguish between pathogens and non-pathogens, outside of particular 
contexts. First, the specificity of antigen recognition by lymphocyte receptors is the result 
of collective interactions with antigen-presenting and other types of cells, and not by B-cell 
or T-cell receptors in isolation (Cohen 1992; Cohen 2000a). Secondly, it is well established 
that lymphocyte receptors can recognize non-virulent as well as virulent forms of 
pathogenic microbes. Therefore virtually any type of lymphocyte receptor can bind equally 
well to pathogenic and non-pathogenic agents. Collectively, these data indicate that 
immune receptors can become activated by motifs common to pathogenic and 
nonpathogenic agents and therefore have no power on their own to recognize 
microorganisms as pathogenic or safe.     
In the face of empirical data demonstrating that single types of immune receptors 
cannot distinguish between pathogenic and commensal microbes, some researchers have 
turned to the idea that immune recognition is performed by single types of cells. For 
example, Aderem formulated a “barcode model of immune recognition”. He argues that 
different types of TLRs expressed by an immune cell jointly read a “barcode” on a 
pathogen and induce immune responses accordingly (Figure 1):  “For example, if microbe 
1 activates TLR4 and TLR5, it is likely to be a flagellated gram-negative organism, 
whereas TLR2 and TLR6 together with TLR5 will detect a flagellated gram-positive 
bacterium” (Aderem 2003, p. 344).  
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Figure 1. According to the “barcode model”, immune recognition is not performed by 
single types of immune receptors. Instead, it is performed jointly by several pattern 
recognition receptors (PRRs). The mosaic of PRR activations of an immune cell triggers 
an immune system response of a specific kind (Brown 2001). Source: The Scientist 2003, 
17: 34). 
 
Netea and colleagues have formulated an “integrated model of immune recognition”, 
which was originally designed to explain immune recognition of Candida albicans. 
However, the authors emphasize that that model can be “extrapolated to immune 
recognition of any microorganism” (Netea et al. 2008, p. 75). According to this model, the 
immune response to a microorganism depends on a mosaic of PRR activations. It is 
assumed, exactly as in the “barcode model of immune recognition”, that it is an integrated 
activation of various PRRs rather than a single type PRR that can produce a uniquely 
tailored response. Despite similarities with the barcode model, the integrated model by 
Netea and colleagues is more advanced and takes into account that each type of immune 
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cell has its own characteristic set of PRRs. Thus, immune responses to various kinds of 
microorganisms is “cell-type specific” (Netea et al. 2008).  
Vance and colleagues have formulated another model of immune recognition. They 
suggest that pathogen recognition requires molecular detection of three characteristic 
features that make a microorganism pathogenic: microbial growth, cytosolic access and the 
potential to hijack and disrupt normal host cytoskeletal function. There are adaptations that 
make recognition of these non-structural aspects of pathogenicity possible, namely, the 
same types of pattern recognition receptors that have been shown to initiate different 
signaling pathways depending on their cytosolic or membrane-based localization (Barton 
and Kagan 2009). Activation of a cytosolic receptor, in contrast to the activation of the 
same type of membrane receptor, can be a sign of pathogen-induced tissue damage. Thus, 
in this new model of immune recognition, it has been pointed out that topology of a PRR 
plays an important role in discrimination between pathogenic and non-pathogenic agents 
(Vance et al. 2009, p. 13).  
All of the above attempts to fix the paradigm are based on the same general 
assumption: they take it for granted that immune recognition is performed by a single type 
of cell. Intestinal epithelial cells (IECs), for example, have been proposed to be able to 
recognize pathogens (Sansonetti 2004), acting as sentinels for certain types of microbes. 
The crucial feature enabling pathogen detection by IECs seems to be cell polarization (Lee 
et al. 2008): The apical and basolateral surfaces of IECs feature different types of TLR 
molecules (Schmausser et al. 2004). For example, it has been suggested that IECs do not 
express TLR5 on the apical surface thus making it impossible for commensal agents 
resident in the lumen, to activate this receptor (Gewirtz et al. 2001). However, further 
experiments demonstrated that TLR5 is expressed on both surfaces of the epithelium 
(Bambou et al. 2004).  
Selective distribution of pattern recognition receptors (PRRs) on the apical and 
basal layers is only one aspect of IEC polarization. There is empirical evidence suggesting 
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that signaling pathways activated by a receptor of a given type may depend on its apical or 
basolateral localization. For example, activation of TLR9 on the basolateral surface has 
been suggested to lead to degradation of IκB, which is a necessary condition for NFκB 
translocation into the nucleus and for subsequent production of proinflammatory cytokines. 
On the other hand, activation of TLR9 on the apical surface seems to inhibit the activation 
of NFκB. (In this latter case, IκB is phosphorylated and ubiquitinated but not degraded) 
(Lee et al. 2006). In addition, the types of activated signaling pathways seem to depend on 
cytosolic or membrane-based localization of the receptors (Vance et al. 2009). Taking into 
account this compartmentalization of PRRs, it has been proposed that IECs can promote 
pro-inflammatory responses only against those bacteria that penetrate the epithelium and 
activate intracellular or basolateral PRRs (Mueller and Macpherson 2006) Thus, tissue 
damage produced by intestinal microbes is suggested to be a necessary condition for 
activation of inflammatory type responses. However, empirical evidence indicates that 
luminal agents can promote pro-inflammatory responses without penetrating the 
epithelium. For example, non-invasive Salmonella typhimurium has been shown to 
stimulate TLR5 on the apical surface of IECs leading to the production of the 
proinflammatory mediator CCL20 (Bambou et al. 2004; Rimoldi et al. 2005a). Similarly, 
activation of apical TLR2 has been shown to induce production of the proinflammatory 
cytokine IL-8 (Lee et al. 2006). Moreover, luminal bacteria are known to induce 
production of IEC-derived factors such as TGF-β. TGF-β has been shown to promote 
protective as well as regulatory responses against bacteria (Mangan et al. 2006; Strobl and 
Knapp 1999; Veldhoen 2006). The fact that intestinal microflora are able to trigger IBD 
suggests that IECs do not always downregulate proinflammatory responses against gut 
microflora (Sartor 2008). 
        Dendritic cells (DCs) are another class of cells believed to be decisive regarding the 
phenotype of immune responses; “Pathogen recognition by Toll-like receptors (TLRs) on 
dendritic cells (DCs) leads to DC maturation and the initiation of adaptive immunity” 
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(Münz et al. 2005, p.203). Interactions between intestinal microbes and dentritic cells are 
facilitated by microfold cells (M-cells), which transport luminal agents from one side of 
the follicle-associated epithelium of the Payer’s patches (PPs) to the subepithelial dome 
area (Wassef et al. 1989). Thus transported microorganisms and antigens can be sampled 
by DCs located in close proximity to the epithelial cell layer. Moreover, intestinal DCs can 
sample luminal agents directly through the epithelial cell layer. DCs have been shown to 
express tight junction-like structures that allow them to extend their dendrites between 
adjacent IECs into the lumen and take up antigens or microorganisms (Rescigno et al. 
2001).  
 DCs recognize microorganisms by means of their PRRs. However, the PRRs of 
DCs have been shown to lack the capacity to recognize pathogenic microbes specifically; 
“TLR agonist interaction with their receptors on DCs has the capacity to induce or expand 
Treg as well as pathogenic T cells” (Mills 2008, p. 518). Moreover, the course of immune 
responses induced by DC depends on conditioning by IEC-derived factors (Iliev 2007; 
Iliev 2009a; Iliev 2009b). Depending on conditioning by cytokines, intestinal DCs can 
promote the differentiation of T cells into regulatory T cells or effector T cells.  
In addition to DCs and IECs, macrophages and neurophils have been proposed to 
be able to distinguish between pathogenic and nonpathogenic microbes. However, there is 
evidence suggesting that the type of response induced by a macrophage or a neutrophil 
depends on detection of common microbial constituents and environmental conditions 
more than the actual status of the recognized microorganism as pathogenic or safe. For 
example, intestinal macrophages, in contrast to other kinds of macrophages, have been 
shown to be resistant to the induction of inflammatory responses despite retaining their 
phagocytic and bactericidal functions (Smythies et al. 2005). This resistance helps prevent 
induction of active responses against non-pathogenic bacteria that may enter the 
subepithelial tissues because of tissue damage. Neurophils have been shown to target 
pathogenic microorganisms, non-pathogenic microorganism and the tissues of the host. 
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Thus, despite expectations, neutrophils do not manifest the power to discriminate on their 
own between pathogenic and commensal agents. These cells can contribute to accurate 
pathogen detection only in very specific environmental conditions (Nathan 2006). 
Collectively, these data suggest that single types of immune cells cannot recognize 
microbes as pathogenic or safe.  
 
Single types of cells and molecules, in principle, cannot recognize pathogens because 
pathogens lack structures unique to them  
As we have discussed above, empirical evidence indicates that single types of receptors or 
single types of cells lack the power on their own to distinguish between pathogenic and 
non-pathogenic agents. However, this empirical argument does not exclude the possibility 
of a future discovery of a class of pathogen-detecting-cells or pathogen-detecting-
molecules. Here, we argue that discovery of such a class is unlikely; there are fundamental 
reasons why no single type of cell or single type of receptor can recognize pathogens.  
        Immune cells sense their environment by means of their receptors. These receptors 
recognize molecular motifs in the microenvironment. Taking this into account, we can say 
that an immune cell would be able to discriminate between pathogenic and non-pathogenic 
microbes only if pathogenic and non-pathogenic (commensal) microbes would have 
molecular motifs unique to each type; “In general, the immune system distinguishes self 
from infectious non-self by sensing structures unique to pathogens” (Bauer 2006, p. 13). 
The structures thought to be unique to pathogens are often referred to as “pathogen-
associated molecular patterns” (Janeway and Medzhitov 2002). “Microbial pathogens 
possess specific molecular patterns called “pathogen-associated molecular patterns” 
(PAMPs). The host innate immune system recognizes these PAMPs by germline-encoded 
pattern recognition receptors (PRRs) to elicit immune responses, such as the production of 
proinflammatory cytokines” (Kumagai et al. 2008, p.86). Accordingly, markers thought to 
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be unique to commensals have sometimes been referred to as “commensal-associated 
molecular patterns” (CAMPs) (Cario et al. 2002). 
            Do microbes really express such discriminatory molecular motifs? The question, 
however, is hypothetical because the same microorganism can be pathogenic in one 
circumstance and commensal or beneficial in another (reviewed in Casadevall and Pirofski 
2001). For example, Helicobacter pylori colonizes the gastric mucosa of 80–90% of people 
in less developed countries (Falkow 2006, p. 702), but it causes symptomatic disease in 
only 15–20% of infected individuals (Ferrero 2005). The Myxoma virus is extremely 
pathogenic to European rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus), but non-pathogenic to genetically 
resistant American rabbits (Sylvilagus audubonii) (Kerr and McFadden 2002). The same 
strains of uropathogenic Escherichia coli clones can be commensal in one condition and 
pathogenic in another (Klemm et al. 2007). One could provide a very large number of 
examples of microbes whose pathogenic potential is context-dependent. Obviously, the 
pathogenic potential of a microbe varies with the colonization site and depends on the state 
of the host immune system. “The question ‘what is a pathogen’ cannot be separated from 
the question ‘what is a host’” (Casadevall and Pirofski 2002, p. 2). 
As we have already mentioned, the pathogenesis of an H. pylori infection depends 
on both host and bacterial factors (Ferrero 2005; Viala et al. 2004). However, this does not 
exclude the possibility of H. pylori being recognized as pathogenic by epithelial cells on 
the basis of a single marker: PGN (Viala et al. 2004). Similarly, it has been suggested that 
the Myxoma virus, the causative agent of rabbit myxomatosis, can be detected as 
pathogenic on the basis of the “recognition of a viral pathogen-associated molecular 
pattern, such as Myxoma virus DNA or newly synthesized viral RNA” (Vilček 2004, p. 
1206). The difference between permissive and non-permissive hosts of the virus has been 
said to depend on the potential to induce mitogen-activated protein kinase (MAPK) – 
mediated production of interferon α/β (IFNα/β) (Wang et al. 2004). In the case of 
uropathogenic E. coli, the commensal-to-pathogenic shift seems to be mediated by the 
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acquisition of the potential to adhere to the epithelial cells of the urinary tract (Edén et al. 
1976). It has been suggested that E. coli can use type 1 fimbriae to attach to the epithelium 
(Klemm et al. 2007). There is a component of type 1 fimbriae, adhesion molecule FimH, 
which has recently been demonstrated to function as a ligand of TLR4 (Mossman et al. 
2008). As one can see, it has been suggested that simple molecules are the only triggering 
factors that initiate defense responses against the microorganisms.  
Even if we agree that pathogens can be recognized on the basis of a single 
molecular marker, the marker can hardly be classified as a pathogen-associated molecular 
pattern. For example, peptidoglycan is a component of cell walls of pathogenic and non-
pathogenic, gram-positive and gram-negative bacteria (Guan and Mariuzza 2007). TLR9 in 
the intestine are continuously stimulated by the dinucleotide CpG independently of their 
pathogenic or commensal origin. TLR4 can also be activated by ligands whose expression 
is not an exclusive domain of pathogenic microbes (Sandor and Buc 2005). 
As we have seen many PRR ligands are expressed by both pathogenic and 
nonpathogenic agents. However there is a class of features that might be exclusive domains 
of pathogenic agents. These are the products of the so called “pathogenicity genes”; 
“Genetic analyses have shown that bacterial pathogens differ from their nonpathogenic 
relatives or commensal bacteria by the presence of specific pathogenicity genes” 
(Magalhaes et al. 2007). Toxins, polysaccharide capsules, secretion systems and IgA 
proteases seem to be exclusive to pathogenic agents. The fact that immunosuppression of 
the host can lead to a change in host-parasite relationship from symbiosis to pathogenesis 
challenges the pathogenicity gene concept (Rubin 1993). Surprisingly, the opposite can 
also happen; an initially pathogenic microorganism can become symbiotic if the immune 
system succeeds in controlling microbial expansion and tissue damage (Hentschel et al. 
2000). If the status of a microbe depends on the immune competence of the host, 
expression of a virulence gene by the microbe cannot serve as a reliable marker of its 
pathogenicity. If the potential to produce damage to the host is host-dependent, the host 
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may have to “self-reflect” in order to learn whether a microbe is pathogenic (cf. Cohen 
2007).  
Indeed, no clear-cut distinction can be made between virulence factors and 
symbiosis factors. A standard example of a virulence gene that belongs to a pathogenicity 
island is a gene coding for the type III secretion system (T3SS). T3SS is a 
microhomologue of a syringe that is used by many gram-negative bacteria such as 
Salmonella to transfer into the cytosol of the host proteases that can interfere with the 
physiology of the host cell  (Galán and Collmer 1999). One might think that T3SS would 
serve as a dependable context-independent marker of pathogenicity. However, it has been 
demonstrated that, depending on the context, T3SS can be used by the same bacterial 
species as a virulence factor or as a symbiosis factor (Galán and Wolf-Watz 2006; Silver et 
al. 2007). Moreover, type III and type IV secretion systems have been shown to be 
expressed by many commensal bacteria (Nagai and Roy 2003; Tampakaki et al. 2004).  
Tracheal cytotoxin (TCT), a fragment of a bacterial PGN, is known to be a powerful 
tissue-damaging factor (Goldman et al. 1982). However, it has also been shown to be an 
important symbiotic factor enhancing tissue development (Koropatnick et al. 2004). Apart 
from genes that allow subjugation of host cell machinery,  other genes enable pathogenic 
agents to adhere to the epithelial cell wall. Enterohemorrhagic E. coli has been found to 
express an adherence factor called the E. coli common pilus (ECP). Pili are traditionally 
considered as virulence factors (Jonson et al. 2005); however, it has also been 
demonstrated that ECP is critical for colonization by both pathogenic and commensal E. 
coli (Rendón et al. 2007).  
As one can see, the products of the so-called “pathogenicity” genes cannot be 
reliable markers of pathogenicity. This is because there are non-pathogenic microbes that 
express these genes and there are microbes that are pathogenic despite lacking them. 
However, the most unexpected support for the thesis that the property of being pathogenic 
is not just a matter of having certain unique structural or biochemical features comes from 
28 
 
studies showing that, in certain conditions, persistent bacterial infections have long-lasting 
beneficial consequences for the host (Falkow 2006). For example, it has been pointed out 
that the coordinated balance between H. pylori infection and the host immune response has 
beneficial effects for the host (Blaser and Atherton 2004). Thus, from a wider perspective, 
a putative pathogen can establish its role as a symbiont.  
As one can see, cytotoxins, secretion systems, fimbriae and others can be virulence 
factors in some conditions, colonization factors in other conditions and symbiosis factors 
in yet other conditions. Pathogenic and commensal microorganisms appear to employ 
similar or even identical molecular mechanisms to express their pathogenic or symbiotic 
potential (Hentschel et al. 2000). In particular, both pathogenic and symbiotic bacteria 
must actively “manipulate” the host immune system to make it possible for them to 
colonize the body. In short, no microorganism is just pathogenic or just commensal. Being 
pathogenic or commensal is not a pre-established, context-independent and host-
independent property. Any microorganism is pathogenic or commensal in a given context, 
under given conditions. It is the interplay between the context and the intrinsic features of a 
microbe that make it pathogenic or safe. Thus, in addition to the genetic predilections of a 
microorganism, environmental factors play an important role in defining a microorganism 
as pathogenic or not (Rescigno et al. 2008, p. 669).  Since the identity of a microbe as 
pathogenic or safe does not depend on its structural features exclusively, a single type of 
receptor or a single type of cell is not in the position to recognize the microbe as 
pathogenic or safe in principle.  
 
Return to basics: What makes a pathogen a pathogen? 
Structure is an important factor influencing the pathogenic or commensal function of a 
given microbe. However, as we have seen, structurally identical agents can be pathogenic 
or commensal depending on the context. This implies that structure is not the only factor. 
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In the gastrointestinal tract, another important pathogenicity making-factor is the 
composition of the commensal flora.  
There are at least four ways in which commensal bacterial communities can 
influence the status of a microorganism as pathogenic or commensal. First, luminal 
bacteria can provide a degree of protection by occupying environmental niches needed by 
pathogens or by producing antimicrobial peptides (Corr et al. 2007). The damaging 
potential of a microorganism can thus be modulated by competition with other microbes. 
Secondly, bacteria are equipped with quorum-sensing mechanisms whose activation can 
promote expression of genes that mediate attachment, invasion, dissemination and survival 
in the host. Induction or inhibition of these genes can affect the capacity of a 
microorganism to invade the body (Sperandio et al. 2003; Walters and Sperandio 2006). 
Thirdly, commensal-derived metabolites such as butyrate have been shown to inhibit the 
production of proinflammatory cytokines and promote secretion of immunoregulatory 
mediators such as IL-10 (Saemann et al. 2000). This IL-10 production can in turn 
indirectly affect the pathogenic properties of microbes. Finally, alterations in the 
composition of commensal communities can affect the balance between immunity and 
tolerance and thus facilitate or impede the power of bacteria to establish a site of infection. 
For example, one commensal species, Faecalibacterium prausnitzii, has been shown to 
induce the production of IL-10 and downregulate secretion of TNF-α and IL-12 by an 
epithelial cell line (Sokol et al. 2008). This suggests that F. prausnitzii has the capacity to 
attenuate immune responsiveness to other bacterial species in the intestine. This down-
regulation of responsiveness can assure integrity of the mucosal tissues and enhance the 
non-pathogenic properties of some agents.  
Studies by Ivanov and colleagues provide another example of how alterations in the 
composition of gut microflora can influence pathogenic or commensal properties of 
intestinal microbes. The specific composition of commensal communities has been shown 
to regulate the balance between interleukin-17 producing CD4
+
 T-cells (Th17 cells) and 
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Foxp3
+
 regulatory T-cells (Tregs) (Ivanov et al. 2008). Disregulation of the balance 
between these two classes of cells can influence the pathogenic potential of many kinds of 
intestinal microorganisms (Belkaid and Tarbell 2009). Everything being taken into account, 
it is becoming clear that the microbiota of the human gut produce complex and powerful 
mechanisms for shaping the pathogenic or symbiotic potential of any intestinal microbe 
(Foxman et al. 2008; O’Hara and Shanahan 2006). Therefore, regulated control of the 
composition of the microflora has emerged as a promising therapeutic opportunity for the 
treatment of acute and chronic intestinal diseases (Borchers et al. 2009). 
In addition to the biochemical and structural composition of the gut and the 
microbial environment, the very act of immune recognition is another important 
determinant of the pathogenicity of a given intestinal agent. Sometimes, the recognition of 
a microbe as pathogenic makes it pathogenic and the recognition of the microbe as safe 
makes it safe. For example, Shigella is an opportunistic bacterium responsible for 
dysentery that invades the colonic and rectal mucosa. As a gram-negative bacterium, 
Shigella expresses LPS. Fernandez et al. reported that dimeric IgA produced by B-cells in 
subepithelial tissues colocalizes to LPS in the apical recycling endosome compartment of 
the IEC, thereby preventing LPS-induced NFκB translocation and a subsequent 
proinflammatory response. This colocalization makes it possible for the immune system to 
shut itself down and so avoid recognizing Shigella as pathogenic. This natural down-
regulation of the response assures that the microbe remains non-pathogenic. On the other 
hand, in conditions of IgA deficiency, bacterial-derived LPS can successfully induce 
secretion of TNF-α by IECs and promote pro-inflammatory responses. The inflammation, 
in turn, can lead to mucosal damage, enabling Shigella to colonize the subepithelial tissues 
and so become pathogenic. As one can see, in the case of IgA deficiency, it is the 
recognition of the bacterium as pathogenic that makes it pathogenic (Fernandez et al. 2003). 
Apart from cases where recognition of a microorganism as pathogenic or safe 
makes it pathogenic or safe respectively, there are also opposite examples. Recognition of 
31 
 
a microbe as safe can sometimes grant it the power to invade the body and become 
pathogenic. Many microorganisms have developed strategies to hijack host cellular 
mechanisms to assure that non-inflammatory responses will be induced against them. The 
most straightforward example is that of Salmonella typhimurium. Salmonella expresses a 
type III secretion system that allows it to transfer effector proteins into host cells. One of 
these effector proteins is a deubiquitinase that prevents polyubiquitination of IκB. This 
mechanism inhibits NFκB-mediated TNF-α production (Le Negrate et al. 2008; Ye et al. 
2007).  
As one can see, the property of being pathogenic is not a pre-established feature of 
a microorganism. The property of being pathogenic or commensal is complex, context-
dependent and host-dependent. There are many environmental and structural factors 
influencing the pathogenic behavior of a microorganism, and we have mentioned only a 
few of them. Figure 2 enumerates some additional pathogenicity-making factors. It is very 
important to note that, regardless of their mode of action and number, pathogenicity-
making factors do not act in isolation; there is always a causal interplay between them. In 
other words, the potential to produce damage by a given microbe is realized by causal 
interactions between pathogenicity-making factors, and not by the collective sum of 
individual factors. The same pathogenicity-making factors interlinked by different kinds of 
causal connections can determine the host-damaging potential of a microorganism in 
various ways.  
It is impossible to make a list of all the causal connections between pathogenicity-
making factors and explain how their mutual interactions might jointly affect the status of a 
microorganism as pathogenic or safe. Some examples can help us understand this causal 
interplay. For example, the composition of commensal communities and their immune 
recognition have been cited here as examples of pathogenicity-making factors. There is a 
strong interaction between them, so they can be said to determine pathogenic or 
commensal properties of a given microorganism jointly. For example, it has been proposed 
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recently that Lactobacillus paracasei can downregulate the production of proinflammatory 
cytokines by DCs. By inhibiting these cytokines, L. paracasei can affect the recognition of 
other bacteria by the immune system. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that this probiotic 
microbe can inhibit differentiation of T helper 1 cells (Th1) in response to Salmonella 
typhimurium. Thus, a modified immune recognition of Salmonella can restrain the 
damaging potential of this bacterium (Mileti et al. 2009).  
              There are also studies showing that immune recognition of intestinal microbes can 
be modulated by a combination of specific microbial species. For example, specific 
microbial compositions can induce regulatory responses to S. typhimurium by inhibiting 
proinflammatory NFκB activation following infection. This inhibition increases the 
frequency of CD4
+
CD25
+
FoxP3
+
 regulatory T-cells (Tregs) in the intestinal lamina propria. 
Thus, induced regulatory type responses prevent S. typhimurium-derived inflammatory 
tissue damage, thereby limiting the potential of these bacteria to invade the tissues 
(O'Mahony et al. 2008). In other words, the specific composition of commensal 
communities has been shown to make S. typhimurium safe and this limits the pathogenic 
potential of the bacterium. As one can see, immune recognition and commensal 
composition jointly influence the status of a microorganism as pathogenic or safe. 
However, one should be aware that the ultimate status of a microbe does not depend on the 
joint action of just two factors but on a complex causal interplay between a number of 
factors. Some of these causal interactions are shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The potential to produce damage to the host (pathogenicity) is constituted by 
various intrinsic and extrinsic features of a given microbe. It is crucial to note that the 
property of being pathogenic is constituted by these features jointly. In other words, the 
status of a microorganism as pathogenic (or safe) results from interplay between 
pathogenicity-making factors and not from their collective impact. Perhaps the simplest 
example of the interplay is the interaction between environmental conditions and the 
expression of colonization factors. Some “virulence” factors are believed to be expressed 
only in certain pH, temperature, ion concentration or oxygen concentration. For example 
the expression of type 3 secretion system by Shigella flexeri is controlled by local 
concentration of O2 (Marteyn et al. 2010). On the other hand, the expression of the 
colonization factors by a microorganism can change environmental conditions directly or 
indirectly. For example, Helicobacter pylori secrete urease that increases pH in its 
microenvironment (Celli et al. 2009).  
 
How does pathogen/non-pathogen discrimination take place? 
If a single type of receptor or a single type of cell is not able to tell whether a given 
microorganism is pathogenic or safe, then how is recognition of the difference performed 
by the immune system? If the status of a microorganism depends on a number of proximal 
and distant environmental factors, then reliable recognition of the microorganism as 
pathogenic or safe requires recognition of all of these factors. Therefore, we propose here 
that immune recognition of a microorganism as pathogenic or safe requires the engagement 
of multiple detection modules specialized in the detection of individual pathogenicity-
making factors.  
One such detection module is a mechanism dedicated to the identification of the 
exact anatomical localization of a given microbe. Accurate evaluation of the potential 
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danger inherent in an intestinal bacterium requires detecting where the bacterium is located 
in the host. For example, in the context of the gut associated lymphoid tissue (GALT), if a 
bacterium is located in the lamina propria, the bacterium is invasive. If, in contrast, the 
bacterium is retained in the intestinal lumen by a mucus layer, IgAs and tight junctions 
between IECs, it is likely to be harmless.  
There are a number of adaptations in the intestinal immune system that help to 
determine the exact localization of a microorganism, one of which is polarization of IECs 
that has been mentioned above. The kind of signaling pathway initiated by a given type of 
immune receptor may depend on its apical, cytosolic or basolateral localization. However, 
information about the apical or basolateral localization of a microorganism alone is not 
sufficient to determine its status as pathogenic or safe. For example, Helicobacter pylori do 
not normally penetrate the epithelium, but rather express their pathogenic potential by 
altering epithelial cell functions (Ferrero 2005, p. 880). Moreover, commensal non-
pathogenic bacteria may find themselves in the submucosal tissues because of tissue 
damage. If the anatomical localization of a microorganism would be a reliable marker of 
its status as a pathogen or commensal, it would be advantageous for the host to express 
PRRs exclusively on the basolateral surface of the epithelium. This possibility was 
investigated extensively but turned out to be wrong (Coombes and Maloy 2007).  
Another important piece of information about the status of a microorganism as 
pathogenic or safe comes from a detection module specializing in the recognition of 
microbial structural features. These features are sensed directly by antigen-sampling DCs 
and IECs. Recognition of such structural features is translated into signals that can 
influence the type of induced response.  
Detecting structural motifs and topology provides very important information to 
help the immune system identify a microorganism as pathogenic or safe. However, as 
discussed above, the potential to produce damage to the host by a given agent does not 
only depend on its localization and structure, but also on the composition of the intestinal 
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flora (cf. Figure 2). Consequently, there is a specialized detection module whose role is to 
recognize the composition of commensal communities; this module involves receptors on 
the apical surface of the intestinal epithelium. Activation of these receptors is translated 
into signals that can modulate immune responses accordingly. Different bacterial products 
can activate different signaling cascades that are translated into secreted cytokines, 
chemokines and other mediators. Apart from being able to activate various intracellular 
signaling pathways, commensal bacteria are able to suppress signaling cascades at different 
levels of their activation. For example, it has been shown that Yersinia spp. blocks the 
NFκB pathway at the level of IκB phosphorylation, whereas Bacteroides spp. can inhibit 
transcriptional activity of NFκB by activating peroxisome-proliferation-activated receptor-
γ pathways (Artis 2008; Rescigno 2009). Inhibition of specific signaling pathways at 
different levels of activation results in transcriptional responses correlated with the 
presence of specific bacterial products in the intestine 
As one can see, no single detection module alone has the capacity to distinguish 
between pathogenic and non-pathogenic microbes. Instead, each module provides 
important information about the damaging potential of a given microorganism. All these 
pieces of information have to be integrated to empower the immune system to decide about 
the type of response is appropriate for dealing with the microbe. The immune system 
cannot achieve this object by behaving as a passive collector of cues about various aspects 
of a microorganism; the system has to integrate all the collected information. Just as 
pathogenicity is the outcome of a multiplicity of pathogen and host factors, the recognition 
of pathogenicity requires the integrated recognition of a multiplicity of factors (Figure 2). 
In other words, the immune system must be able to recognize the interactions of 
pathogenicity-making factors, and not only their mere presence or absence.  
This “holistic” recognition requires an exchange of information between detection 
modules for individual pathogenicity-making factors. How is this exchange of information 
possible? It is difficult to answer this question because of the complexity of the integration 
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processes and the scarcity of knowledge about them. However, one can get some idea of 
how bits of information about pathogenicity-making factors are integrated by looking at 
the relationship between two well-characterized detection modules for microbial structure 
and for the composition of the environment. These two cues have to be integrated. DCs 
detect information about the structure of the microbe, and IECs detect information about 
the composition of the luminal flora. Integration of the information results from a constant 
dialogue between these two classes of cells. Activated IECs produce factors that can 
modulate the activity of DCs and oher antigen presenting cells in the submucosal tissues. 
IEC-derived products have been shown to condition DCs to promote certain types of 
immune responses (Rescigno et al. 2008). Thus, immune responses induced by activated 
DCs depend on the sampled antigens as well as on IEC conditioning mediators (Iliev et al. 
2007; Iliev 2009a; Iliev 2009b). For, example, it has been demonstrated that luminal 
bacterial products can activate IECs to produce thymic stromal lymphopoietin (TSLP). 
TSLP, in turn, has the capacity to induce the production of IL-10 and downregulate the 
production of IL-12 by DCs (Rimoldi et al. 2005b). Activation of naïve T-cells in the 
presence of IL-10 promotes their conversion into IL-10-producing T-cells. IL-10-
producing T-cells, in turn, have been shown to be able to cure and protect from colitis in a 
T-cell transfer model. In addition to TLSP, there are many other mediators produced by 
IECs in response to different kinds of luminal content, including TGF-β, prostaglandin E2 
(PGE2), B-cell activating factor (BAFF) and proliferation-inducing ligand (APRIL) (He et 
al. 2007; Sansonetti and Medzhitov 2009). Production of these factors by IECs depends on 
gene expression. Gene expression in IECs, in turn, is influenced by the composition of 
commensal-bacterial communities. As one can see, informational crosstalk between a 
module dedicated to recognition of commensal bacterial composition and a module 
specializing in detection of microbial structure expresses itself in the conditioning of 
dendritic cells.  
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Figure 3 lists observations indicating that recognition of a microorganism as 
pathogenic or safe is mediated by detection of factors that influence the status of a given 
microorganism as pathogenic or safe. It also illustrates the idea that fragments of 
information about various properties of a microorganism must be put together to produce a 
unified and properly adjusted immune response. This unified representation of a 
microorganism in the immune system is what we call immune recognition. The mere 
binding of a ligand to a receptor may activate the receptor, but it does not constitute 
functional recognition, which, as we have discussed here, depends on the integration of 
information collected from various sources. In order to reflect the dynamic interaction 
between pathogenicity-making factors, dynamic crosstalk between individual detection 
mechanisms has to take place. We refer to this crosstalk as “co-respondence” (Cohen 
2000a). Co-respondence is a complex exchange of signals between cells and molecules 
leading to a decision at the level of the interacting population. In our case, it is an inter-
cellular and inter-molecular “dialogue” whose outcome is recognition of a microorganism 
as pathogenic or commensal (Cohen 2000b). Since there is no information center in a strict 
topological sense (no brain-like controller), “co-respondence” itself should be regarded as 
a central processing unit integrating pieces of information about pathogenicity-making 
factors (Cohen 2006). Representation of a microorganism as pathogenic or safe is not 
encoded in a single type of receptor activation or cell activation, but is a distributed image 
unfolding over time and involving the dynamic actions of a great number of signals (cf. 
Cohen 2000a, pp. 174-181, on immunological images).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
Figure 3. There are many factors that jointly determine the status of a microorganism as 
pathogenic or commensal. The Immune system has evolved detection modules specializing 
in recognition of these factors. Intrinsic features, environmental conditions, state of the 
host and other microorganisms influence pathogenic or commensal properties of a given 
microbe. Therefore there are detection modules specializing in recognition of the intrinsic 
features, environmental conditions, state of the host and the composition of commensal 
communities respectively. All these detection modules have to be integrated to give rise to 
immune recognition of a certain kind. It is interesting to note that one of the detection 
modules is self-recognition. If the property of being pathogenic is host-dependent, the 
immune system has to be able to recognize itself in order to produce suitably tailored 
immune responses (Cohen 2000a; Cohen 2007).  
 
Conclusions: A systems biology approach is needed to understand immune 
recognition 
The theory that single types of cells and molecules act as sentinels (Appendix 1), when 
originally formulated, was a good representation of the available data. However, more 
recent experimental findings challenge this paradigm; discrimination between pathogens 
and non-pathogens is the outcome of a complex exchange of signals between cells and 
molecules, both of the host and the bacteria. Why then is this paradigm still maintained?  
One possible reason is methodological. Contemporary immunology tends to favor 
molecular and cellular methods of analysis. Such reduction allows one to study single 
types of cells and their local interactions, and permits tracing a linear sequence of 
consecutive events from cause to effect. However, immune recognition is barely visible at 
this reduced level of analysis. Discrimination between pathogenic and non-pathogenic 
microbes does not involve single types of cells but many types of cells, but complex causal 
networks (Figure 3). Most importantly, immune recognition requires integrated exchange 
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of signals and it is the exchange that represents the greatest obstacle to the classical 
paradigm of the discriminating sentinel.  
Biologic processes that go beyond direct signaling within or between cells can be 
termed systemic processes. Here, we show that immune recognition, is not only a cellular 
and molecular process but is also a systemic process performed by the system as a system. 
A bird’s eye view is needed to grasp systemic processes. One has to zoom out to larger 
scales in order to see and understand how the system makes its decisions about how to 
respond to a microorganism (Cohen and Harel 2006). Systems biology, the study of a 
system as a whole, is a new field that promises to explain higher-level biological processes. 
We propose that immune recognition is a property of the system domain (Benoist et al. 
2006; Gardy et al. 2009; Merbl et al. 2009).   
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Part 2 
 
Chronic immune misrecognition: 
Inflammatory bowel disease 
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The above hierarchical model of immune recognition can be used to elucidate the 
fundamental basis of inflammatory bowel disease (IBD). IBD is a group of conditions 
characterized by chronically inflamed intestinal tissue. It includes two major forms: 
Crohn’s disease (CD) and uncreative colitis (UC). Symptoms of IBD include diarrhea, 
abdominal pain, rectal bleeding and fever. The primary etiology of IBD is unknown as 
many different combinations of genetic, microbial and environmental factors have been 
shown to support it. The diversity of mechanisms supporting IBD prevents development of 
an effective treatment strategy that would target integrated cause of this disease and restore 
homeostasis in the gut. However, after several decades of studies, a unified picture of IBD 
is emerging. Here, we propose that the shared proximal cause of various forms of IBD is a 
loss of robustness in the immune recognition machinery at the systems level.  
 
Factors that support IBD may be clustered into several different categories  
Inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) is a group of conditions characterized by chronically 
inflamed intestinal tissue. It includes two major forms: Crohn’s disease (CD) and 
uncreative colitis (UC). The primary etiology of IBD is unknown as many alternative 
combinations are known to support it. Here we catalogue alterations associated with IBD 
according to the biological function or biological domain they alter.  
 
1. Structural changes in microbes. Intestinal microbes are sensed by pattern 
recognition receptors (PRRs) that bind conserved microbe-associated molecular 
patterns (MAMPs). Structural changes in commensal bacteria may allow them to 
access epithelial PRRs, change the pattern of their activation and promote 
inflammatory-type responses. Acquisition of virulence factors by commensal 
bacteria like E. Coli has been found to be associated with many instances of IBD 
(Martin et al. 2004; Martinez-Medina et al. 2009). The colitogenic strains of E Coli 
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are highly adherent and thus stimulate apical PRRs directly (Darfeuille-Michaud et 
al. 1998).  
 
2. Specific alterations in the chemical and physical environment of the intestinal 
lumen. These alterations include (but are not limited to) changes in the thickness 
and quality of the mucus layer, changes in the level and type of antimicrobial 
molecules (defensins, cathelicidins), alterations in the concentration of fermentation 
products (short chain fatty acids, butyrate), products of microbial metabolism 
(ATP), alterations in the peristalsis, changes in luminal pH and shifts in the 
concentration of ions and compounds. These chemical and physical changes can 
promote intestinal inflammation characteristic of IBD in many different ways; for 
example, short chain fatty acids (SCFA) have been shown to attenuate colitis by 
means of GPR43 receptor signaling (Maslowski et al. 2009). Therefore changes in 
the concentration of SCFA and polymorphisms of GPR43 are IBD risk factors 
(Sina et al. 2009).  
 
3. Imbalances in the activity of various bodily systems of the host. For example, an 
elevated sympathetic nervous system tone, psychological stress, anxiety and trauma 
have been shown to be contributing factors in IBD (Mackner et al. 2011).  
 
4. Alterations in the composition of intestinal microbes (dysbiosis). Several types of 
changes in the intestinal microbes have been found to be associated with various 
forms of IBD. They include decreases in the bacterial load (Frank et al. 2007), loss 
of microbial diversity (Ott 2004) and change in the ratios of bacterial species 
occupying the lumen (Frank et al. 2007). There is no consensus regarding the 
question whether the microbial imbalances are primary or secondary to alterations 
in the immune activity (Kaser et al. 2010). Regardless of its exact source, dysbiosis 
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has proved to be a powerful factor promoting aberrant responses in IBD (Garrett et 
al. 2007).  
 
5. Defects in the ability to detect structural features of intestinal microbes by the 
immune system. Individuals suffering from IBD often have their PRR genes 
mutated. One example is polymorphism in the NOD2 gene in patients suffering 
from CD (Barrett et al. 2008). Mutated NOD2 affects the ability to sense muramyl 
dipeptide MDP, which is a component of a bacterial cell wall peptidoglycan (PGN) 
(Rescigno and Nieuwenhuis 2007). It has also been suggested that a polymorphism 
of TLR4 can contribute to the development of both CD and UC (Franchimont et al. 
2004). Other studies indicate that NOD1, TLR1, TLR2, TLR3 and TLR6 each can 
contribute to the pathogenesis of IBD (Yamamoto-Furusho and Podolsky 2007). 
 
6. Alterations in intestinal epithelial cells (IECs) function. To maintain their secretory, 
barrier and signal transduction functions, IECs must keep their metabolism under 
control. Disturbances in the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) activity require a 
cytoprotective reaction in the form of an unfolded protein response (UPR). The 
special role of the UPR pathway in IECs is illustrated by the fact that these cells 
express isoforms of UPR molecules that have not been found in other cells (Kaser 
et al. 2010). Mutations in genes coding for components of the UPR signaling 
pathway, like XBP1, have been found to be associated with various forms of IBD 
(Kaser et al. 2008). Another form of reaction to ER stress (and other forms of stress) 
is autophagy. Autophagy helps to restore homeostasis in a cell by clearing foreign 
material including microbes and toxins. It is well established that mutations in 
autophagy genes such as ATG16L1 or IRGM are associated with an increased risk 
for CD (Hampe et al. 2007). IBD is also associated with defects that compromise 
specific functions of IECs. These defects include abnormalities in tight junction 
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proteins (Vetrano et al. 2008) or in proteins involved in epithelial regeneration. For 
example IBD is known to be associated with a reduction in HNF1α, a transcription 
factor playing an important role in the maintenance of intestinal epithelial integrity 
(Ahn et al. 2008).  
 
7. Alterations in the physiology of immune self-recognition. Apart from defending the 
host, the immune system is also engaged in self-maintenance (Cohen 2000). This 
requires a certain degree of self-reactivity (Cohen 2007). This aspect of immune 
functioning is often found defective in IBD. In particular, UC involves a strong 
autoimmune component. Anti-neutrophylic cytoplasmic antibodies cross-reacting 
with colonic bacteria have been found in 60%–75% of patients suffering from UC 
(Duerr et al. 1991). Moreover, it has been found that a population of IgG antibodies 
in UC patients reacts with a cytoskeletal microfilament protein, tropomyosin 5 
(hTM5), an isoform of the protein predominantly present in the colon (Das and 
Biancone 2008). 
 
8. Molecular defects altering communication between gut microflora and cells of the 
gut associated lymphoid tissue (GALT). Luminal microbes (in particular segmented 
filamentous bacteria, SFBs) can stimulate PRRs from the apical surface. Different 
species of these bacteria have been shown to modulate signaling pathways in IECs 
in different ways (Artis 2008). This varied modulation determines the repertoire of 
IEC-derived products which condition antigen presenting cells (APCs) to promote 
conversion of naïve T-cells into regulatory or effector phenotypes (Illiev et al. 
2009a; Iliev et al. 2009b). This IEC-mediated modulation of immune responses by 
specific composition of luminal microbes is often impaired in IBD. For example, 
Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron can normally influence NF-κB signaling in IECs by 
PPAR-γ-dependent removal of an active transcriptional subunit RelA from the 
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nucleus (Kelly et al. 2004). However, there is some evidence that PPAR-γ signaling 
in IECs can be impaired in UC (Dubuquoy et al. 2003) making it difficult for this 
commensal species to modulate responses via the PPAR-γ pathway. 
  
9. Defects downstream of the PRRs. There are many different ways in which the 
mucosal immune system can respond to intestinal microbes. TH1, TH2, TH17 type 
responses are recognized as distinct categories, but there is evidence for many more 
intermediate T helper types (Matzinger and Kumala 2011). Tailored immune 
responses require not only functional PRR signaling but also a reliable cytokine 
network. Key agents of the network system include IL-23, Il-22, IL-6 and IL-10, 
each playing a different role in the modulation of immune responses in the gut. 
This modulation is often found impaired in IBD. For example, the capacity of IL-
23 to promote differentiation of Th17 cells has been shown to be impaired in IBD 
because of IL-23R polymorphisms (Duerr et al. 2006). CD and UC can also involve 
mutations in STAT3, a component of the pathway mediating IL-6 and IL-10 
signaling (Barrett et al. 2008; Franke et al. 2008).  
 
Hence, at least nine different classes of IBD-related risk factors can be identified. As 
mentioned above and in agreement with the view of Kaser et al. that understanding 
pathogenesis of IBD requires considering factors supporting this disease in their totality 
(2010), we now try to consider synergistic role of different risk factors in affecting the 
activity of the immune system, the recognition of microbes and the potential pathogenicity 
of otherwise innocuous commensals, thus leading to IBD. After having segregated IBD 
risk factors into classes according to the domain or function they alter, we can now group 
them further into those that influence the pathogenicity of a microbe and thus affect the 
immune system indirectly and those that affect it directly (Table 1).  
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Table 1 Domains and functions whose alterations are associated with IBD 
 Nr Altered domain in IBD Integrated role of the 
affected domains 
1 Microbial structure Pathogenicity-making factors 
2 Chemical environment 
3 Activity of various bodily systems  
4 Microbial composition 
5 Pattern detection Detection of pathogenicity-
making factors, integration 
of information about these 
factors and calibration of an 
immune response 
6 IEC functions 
7 Self-recognition 
8 Communication between microbes and 
immune cells 
9 Immune processes downstream of PRRs 
 
 
IBD is correlated with alterations in factors that define the pathogenic potential of 
gut microbes 
We first focus on those risk factors that influence the pathogenicity of a microbe. They 
include structural features of gut microbes, the chemical environment of the intestine, the 
activity of host bodily systems and the composition of the microbiota. What is the 
integrated role of these factors? The answer is that they jointly define the disease-causing 
potential of intestinal agents:  
 
1. Structure is an important pathogenicity-making factor in that it allows microbes to 
adhere, disseminate and penetrate the tissues. For example, flagellum can equip a 
microorganism with the capacity to penetrate.  
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2. Chemical and physical environment in the gut may influence the pathogenicity of 
microbes by inducing expression of virulence factors or by changing the phenotype 
of the immune response. For example. pH can control conversion of commensal 
bacteria into pathogens (De Bernardis et al. 1998).  The chemical environment in 
the lumen can also influence virulence of gut microbes by promoting certain types 
of immune responses. One example is environmental control of Th17-mediated 
responses (Quintana and Weiner 2009). This type of response influences 
pathogenicity of gut microbes by, among other things, controlling the release of 
antimicrobial peptides by IECs and by influencing the integrity of the epithelium 
(Liang et al. 2006).  
 
3. The activity of various bodily systems of the host determines the pathogenic 
potential of microbes by changing their chemical environment or by modulating the 
defense system. For example, psychological stress related to maternal separation 
has been shown to change the composition of gut microbes. This stress established 
the pathogenic status of otherwise opportunistic bacteria and promoted 
inflammation (Bailey and Coe 1999). 
 
4. The composition of the microbiota is a well known pathogenicity-making factor. 
One, obvious mechanism by which the pathogenic potential of microbes is 
modulated by other microbes is through competition for attachment sites and for 
nutrients. Other mechanisms include quorum sensing, which involves release of 
molecules by bacteria that influence the gene expression of other microbes. In 
addition, some bacteria produce antimicrobial peptides that may restrain the 
proliferative capacities of other microbes.  
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Together, these observations indicate that being pathogenic or commensal is not only a 
matter of having a particular structure, but is determined by a complex interplay between 
various environmental factors and the host. IBD involves alterations in these 
pathogenicity-making factors. Indeed a shared feature of various forms of IBD is a shift in 
the status of microbes from commensal to pathogenic because of changes in their structural 
or contextual features (Chassaing and Darfeuille-Michaud 2011). 
  
IBD is correlated with alterations in modules involved in the detection of 
pathogenicity-making factors  
Secondly, we focus on those factors that affect the immune system directly. These can 
interfere with the capacity of the immune and non-immune system to monitor 
pathogenicity-making factors and to integrate information about them.  
 
5. MAMP detection by innate immune cells is required to adjust the host response. 
Structural features of microbes are sensed directly by APCs and this detection 
influences the course of immune responses. As we have seen, this function is 
impaired by mutated PRRs in IBD.  
 
6. Metabolic functions of IECs have to be maintained to allow these cells to 
adequately respond to fluctuations in the concentration of luminal chemicals and to 
provide information about the topology of intestinal microbes. Since chemical the 
environment in the gut influences disease-causing power of gut microbes, it is 
important for the IECs to respond to these microbial changes accurately. Defective 
responses to stress characteristic of IBD may interfere with this function (Garrett et 
al. 2010). IECs are functionally and structurally polarized; they promote different 
types of responses depending on their apical or basolateral stimulation (Lee et al. 
2006). This polarization allows the immune system to promote different types of 
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responses depending on the localization of the microbe relative to the epithelium. 
In IBD, epithelial integrity may be compromised by mutations in genes coding for 
tight junction proteins and other proteins involved in barrier functions. This defect 
may facilitate access of non-pathogenic bacteria to the basal layer and so misinform 
the immune system about their invasive potential.  
 
7. Self-recognition is needed to evaluate the body’s potential to control invasive gut 
microbes. The host immune system itself profoundly influences the disease-causing 
potential of intestinal microbes. The capacity of the immune system to adjust its 
responses relative to its own defense resources is illustrated by the fact that 
adaptive immunity can compensate for deficiencies in host innate immunity (Slack 
et al. 2009). For example, IL-10
-/-
, MyD88
-/-
 mice, despite crippling of the innate 
system, are protected from colitis (Rakoff-Nahoum and Medzhitov 2008). One 
means by which the immune system can acquire information about the disease-
causing potential of intestinal microbes by self-recognition is through detection of 
endogenous damage-associated molecular patterns (DAMPs) (Seong and Matzinger 
2004; Quintana and Cohen 2011). Autoimmune factors involved in certain forms of 
IBD distort the self-recognition abilities of the immune system. 
 
8. Normal communication between gut microflora and GALT is needed to provide 
accurate information about the composition of the microflora. The composition of 
gut microbes is a powerful pathogenicity-making factor. Since different groups of 
bacteria modulate IEC signaling in different ways, their composition is reflected in 
the pattern of IEC-derived products, promoting different types of immune 
responses (Rimoldi et al. 2005; Iliev 2009a; Iliev 2009b). The secretory functions 
of Paneth cells and enteroendocrine cells are controlled by direct recognition of 
bacterial cell products by receptors on the apical surfaces of these cells (Vaishnava 
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et al. 2008). Similarly, phagocytosis by M cells is modulated by microbial sensors 
(Kyd and Cripps 2008) and could be receptor-mediated (Hase et al. 2009). As we 
have mentioned, genetic defects in IBD often entail alterations in the modulation of 
signaling pathways in IECs by specific types of bacteria. These alterations interfere 
with the capacity to acquire information about the microbial composition of the gut 
and lead to inappropriate responses.  
 
9. Processes downstream of the PRRs allow integration of information about factors 
that detect the pathogenic potential of microbes and tailor responses accordingly. 
Defects in genes coding for cytokines, chemokines and their receptors downstream 
of PRR signaling characteristic of IBD may perturb the capacity to integrate 
information about pathogenicity-making factors and lead to inappropriate responses.   
 
All in all, defects in IBD alter the capacity of the system to acquire (or integrate) pieces of 
information about factors that define the disease-causing potential of intestinal microbes.  
 
IBD viewed as chronic immune misrecognition at the systems level 
Realization that inadequate responses in IBD are caused by failures to monitor changes in 
factors that define the disease-causing potential of intestinal microbes challenges the 
classical view of immune recognition and response. According to the classical view, 
immune responses are triggered by single types of receptors or single types of cells: “It is 
now generally accepted that recognition of foreign organisms or damaging circumstances 
by cells of the innate immune system, i.e. antigen-presenting cells (APC), triggers immune 
response initiation” (Barr et al. 2007). 
However, studies of IBD bring us to realize that the decision to respond in a certain 
way is made collectively by many types of cells and molecules engaged in the global 
detection of pathogenicity-making or inflammatory-inducing factors. These cells and 
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molecules exchange signals and integrate information about structural and environmental 
features of microbes to tailor responses accurately (Fig 4A). Thus, immune recognition of 
a microbe as pathogenic or commensal is expressed by a complex, collective signaling 
process rather than by a single receptor ligation or cell activation. We refer to this systemic 
process of information integration and signal exchange as “co-respondence” (Cohen 
2000a).  
The systemic character of immune recognition has two advantages to the host. 
Firstly, it allows tailoring the immune response precisely to the conditions developing in 
the gut. This permits the maintenance of selected groups of bacteria, and restrains or 
eliminates the others. Secondly, it grants robustness. Since the decision to respond in a 
certain way is a product of a process of “deliberation” composed of many cellular and 
molecular agents, damage to one of these components has a limited impact on the overall 
response (Fig 4B,C). If information about the presence of MDP in the cell wall of a 
bacterium is missing, the immune system may still adjust its responses to the invasive 
capacities of the microbe by integrating information about other structural features of the 
microbe, its position relative to the intestinal tissues and the microbial, chemical and host 
environment. For example, the occurrence of a defect in NOD2, one of the most important 
risk factors in CD it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the disease. It is not sufficient 
because Nod
–/– 
mice do not develop spontaneous colitis and most individuals with mutated 
NOD2 never develop IBD (Hugot et al. 2007). It is not necessary because fewer than 20% 
of CD patients are homozygous for the NOD2 susceptibility gene variants (Podolsky 2002). 
All the other genetic factors have been associated with very law frequencies. Only when 
the accumulation of genetic and environmental defects reaches a certain threshold, does 
immune recognition lose its robustness and promotes the chronic immune misrecognition 
and misbehavior we call IBD (Fig. 4D-F).  
All things considered, IBD is a disease of the immune recognition system. 
Alteration in this system is difficult to restore because of its complexity and robustness. 
54 
 
The number of alternative defects sufficient for the expression of the disease may 
supersede the number of molecular elements involved in the system because combinations 
of molecular alterations are needed to compromise the recognition system. Thus, the 
resistance to therapy of IBD may have a similar basis to that of cancer (Kitano 2004). 
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Figure 4. Inflammatory bowel disease as a loss of robustness in the immune recognition 
system. (A) The power of the immune system to distinguish between pathogenic and 
nonpathogenic microbes depends on the capacity of the system to integrate information 
about factors that define the pathogenic potential of intestinal agents (they include 
structural features of the microbes, their localization and their chemical, microbial and 
host environment). (B) Alterations in one pathogenicity-making factor (e.g. a change in the 
microbial composition) can increase the invasive potential of intestinal agents. However, 
the immune system monitors these changes and adjusts its responses accordingly. (C) 
Genetic defects that alter the capacity to detect a single pathogenicity-making factor may 
not interfere with the overall potential to produce accurate responses; information about 
the remaining pathogenicity-making factors may be sufficient to estimate pathogenic 
potential of the microbes accurately (D-F) A coincidence of defects that alter the capacity 
to detect several pathogenicity-making factors or a single defect correlated with profound 
alterations in a pathogenicity-making factor may perturb the whole recognition system and 
lead to chronic immune misrecognition in the form of IBD. 
 
Conclusions 
The capacity of the immune system to maintain homeostasis with the intestinal microbes 
depends on the ability of the system to adjust to changing chemical, microbial and self-
induced alterations. Since these alterations modify the invasive potential of intestinal 
microbes, it is critical for the system to monitor these changes by means of built-in 
mechanisms that translate information about environmental conditions into tailored 
responses.  
 This complex architecture grants robustness. Loss of information about one 
pathogenicity-making factor may be compensated by unaffected pathways that measure 
other parameters of the intestinal agents. In IBD this robustness is lost because of defects 
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in several genes or because of profound environmental perturbations accompanied by 
defects that have already compromised the system.  
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Part 3 
 
Systems level understanding of immune 
recognition and reduction 
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Our analysis in the first part of the thesis led us to conclude that systems level approach is 
needed to understand immune recognition. Here, an attempt is made to clarify this 
statement. Systems level approach is often contrasted with reductionist approach in the 
literature. However, there is also sense of reduction from the point of view of which 
systems biology approach is reductive.  
 Thus our aim in the rest of the thesis is to understand sense in which our 
explanation of immune recognition is reductionist and sense in which it is anti-reductionist. 
This clarification may not only expose the “anatomy” of our own explanation of immune 
recognition in the first part of the thesis but also elucidate the character of standard 
explanatory practices of systems biology and immunology.  
 Our analysis in the remaining part of the thesis consists of three steps. First, we 
clarify the concept of reduction by discussing some of the most influential models of 
reduction in recent philosophy of biology. Second, we explain sense in which systems 
biology approach counts as reductive. Third, we analyze reductionist aspects of systems 
level approach to understanding immune recognition and reveal some limitations of this 
approach.  
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Chapter I 
The idea of reduction in philosophy of biology 
 
In order to understand sense in which systems level approach to understanding immune 
recognition is reductionist and sense in which it is not reductionist, it is first necessary to 
make the idea of reduction possibly clear. In the present chapter we analyze various 
notions of reduction in philosophy of biology and explain what motivates them. This will 
help to find and motivate the notion of reduction best characterizing our own attempt to 
explain immune recognition in molecular and cellular terms.  
 
Reduction: first approximation 
Complex biological processes can be analyzed at distinct levels of granularity. For 
example, memory can be studied at the molecular level, in terms of signaling pathways 
controlling strength of synaptic connections between neurons (Kandel 2001). It may be 
studied at the cellular network level as a process distributed along various brain regions 
(Miyashita 2004). It can also be considered as a psychological process, whose identity is 
constituted by its relationship to other mental states such as mental images, believes and 
desires (Neisser 1997). Realization that a given process can be studied at various levels 
provokes the question of the relationship between these levels. Are they independent from 
one another? For example, are there any relevant aspects of memory storage and retrieval 
that could not be captured by most complete molecular knowledge of these processes? 
Reduction is an important concept helping to answer this and other related kinds of 
questions. 
 In the most general sense, reduction refers to an explanation in which one unit of 
knowledge (usually about higher level features) is subsumed under (or included in) another 
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unit of knowledge (usually about lower level features). Even though this definition is very 
broad, it does not cover all the usages of the term in philosophy. For example some authors 
consider a type of reduction that is not an explanation. Nickles takes into account, what he 
calls “domain preserving” reduction which is a relationship between historically earlier and 
historically later theories. This kind of successional reduction does not seem be a 
subspecies of explanation because historically later theories often do not explain earlier 
theories (cf. Nickles 1973; Sarkar 1998, p. 45). However, even if we limit our discussion to 
reductionist explanation, the above general characterization will give us only a vague idea 
of what reduction is because it does not specify what the relevant units of knowledge are 
and how the subsumption or inclusion should be understood. Here we discuss some of the 
most important notions of reduction in philosophy of biology to understand better what 
reduction is.  
 
Theory reduction: Nagel 
According to some scholars, philosophical debate about reduction in biology was initiated 
by Aristotle (Brigandt and Love 2008). Other authors suggest that it has rather began as 
late as in the seventeenth century (Sarkar 1998, p. 16). However, there is no doubt that the 
modern version of the reductionism/antireductionism debate was initiated by Ernest Nagel 
in the middle of the XX century. Ernest Nagel worked in the context of post-positivist 
philosophy of science. Post-positivist philosophy of science, as well as its predecessor, 
logical neopositivism, emphasized the need for formal, logical analysis of the scientific 
discourse. One of its tenets was the idea that physics is an ideal, prototype science. Thus 
also Nagelian account of reduction was focused on formal aspects of reduction and issues 
particularly relevant for physics.  
 According to Nagel, reduction is a relationship between two theories, T1 and T2 
such that T2 is logically derivable from T1. In particular, reduction requires laws of the 
theory T2 to be deducible from the laws of T1. For example, thermodynamics can be said to 
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be reducible to statistical mechanics if the laws of thermodynamics can be derived from the 
laws of statistical mechanics. For Nagel, reduction was also a form of intertheoretic 
explanation (1961): reducing theory (T1) explains the reduced theory (T2).  
 From the logical point of view, one theory cannot be derived from another theory 
unless the vocabulary of the reduced theory is already included in the language of the 
reducing theory. Having this in mind, Nagel considered two forms of reduction: 
homogenous and heterogeneous. In homogenous reductions, predicates of the reduced and 
the reducing theory have the same meanings and thus their vocabularies are already 
reconciled. In heterogeneous reductions, reduced theory contains terms (predicates) that do 
not appear in the language of the reducing theory (for example “heat” is part of the 
language of thermodynamics but not of the language of statistical mechanics even though 
thermodynamics is reducible to statistical mechanics).  
 According to Nagel, heterogeneous reductions require statements that connect the 
vocabularies of the reduced and the reducing theories. These statements must fix for 
example that heat is mean molecular kinetic energy in the language of statistical mechanics. 
Otherwise, laws concerning heat in thermodynamic cannot be derived from statistical 
mechanics. Thus, in heterogeneous reduction, the reducing theory reduces the reduced 
theory but only with such statements (Nagel 1961, pp. 353-354). This condition was 
labeled by Nagel “condition of connectability”. Statements linking languages of the 
reduced and the reducing theory have been traditionally referred to as bridge principles or 
reduction functions. 
 The idea of bridge principles connecting vocabularies of the reduced and the 
reducing theory initiated an intense debate in philosophy of science. Many authors have 
attempted to specify character of these statements. Some claimed that they should be 
considered as analytical (definitional), others argued that they are synthetic (factual). Nagel 
himself did not specify exactly how these bridge principles should be interpreted. Instead 
he considered three different possibilities. First, that they are logical connections linking 
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meanings of expressions of two theories (this includes the relations of synonymy). Second, 
that they are conventions, established in some historical contexts. Third, that they are 
factual statements that must be discovered empirically (Nagel 1961, p. 354). In order to 
decide which of the three interpretations reflects the actual connections between 
vocabularies of the reduced and the reducing theory in the scientific practice, Nagel 
considered the relationship between “temperature” in classical thermodynamics and “mean 
kinetic energy of molecules” in statistical mechanics. He found that the relationship 
between these two statements cannot be analytical because these expressions are not 
synonymous. However, he did not solve the problem which of the remaining two 
interpretations of connectability statements is applicable in this case. 
 Ernest Nagel focused on formal issues related to reduction. However, as Kenneth 
Waters emphasized, he was well aware of the importance of the non-formal aspects of 
reduction (Waters 1990, p. 126). In particular, Nagel claimed that the conditions of 
reduction such as derivability and connectability do not by themselves assure that the 
reduction is scientifically fruitful. He speculated that non-trivial reductions may involve 
formulation of laws with a broader scope and unexpected associations between already 
established laws (Nagel 1961, p. 358; Waters 1990, p. 126).        
 Sarkar mentions three possible reasons why theory reduction by Nagel was an 
attractive option for post-positivist philosophers. Firstly, it was relatively simple. Secondly, 
it was a modification of a deductive-nomological notion of explanation that was widely 
accepted in the neopositivist circles. Thirdly, it was focused on the epistemic aspect of 
reduction which reflected antimetaphysical approach of neopositivism (Sarkar 1998, p. 26).  
 
Theory reduction: Schaffner 
One of the arguments against the model of reduction by Nagel was that it cannot 
accommodate the fact that the reduced theory often contains false statements (Feyerabend 
1962). Indeed, one reason why reduction of a historically earlier by a historically later 
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theory takes place is that the former is often less accurate than the later. It has been argued 
that even in the context of interlevel reduction, it is often impossible to derive the exact 
laws of the reduced theory from the more fundamental reducing theory. If the reducing 
theory is assumed to include statements that are true, it cannot logically entail a theory 
containing false statements. Such a derivation is impossible because the relation of 
deduction is truth-preserving.  
 In order to solve some of the problems of the Nagelian notion of reduction,  
Kenneth Schaffner proposed General Reduction-Replacement (GRR) model. This model 
can be considered as a development of the original Nagelian model in that it incorporates 
many fundamental assumptions about reductionist relationship elaborated by Nagel. For 
example, GRR model inherits the idea that reduction requires derivability as well as 
connectability. One important difference between the GRR model and the Nagelian model 
is that the reducing theory (T1) it not assumed to entail the original reduced theory (T2) but 
its corrected version (T2*). The corrected version does not contain false statements from 
the point of view of T1. (Thus, it allows to formulate more accurate predictions than T2).  
The idea that the reducing theory entails a corrected version of the reduced theory 
rather than its original version, helped to understand why reduction occurs between the two 
theories even though the reduced theory contains false statements. An important question 
in this context was one of the relationship between the reduced theory and the corrected 
version of the reduced theory. Schaffner emphasized that the relationship between T2 and 
T2* must be of a strong analogy. This analogy allows one to maintain, for example, that the 
theory T2 is reducible to T1 even though it is really the theory T2* that is reducible. 
 Another contribution of Schaffner to the reductionist debate was clarification of the 
concept of bridge principles. He referred to this principle as reduction function and claimed 
that it is a function that makes predicates of the reduced (in fact corrected version of the 
reduced) and the reducing theory coextensional (Schaffner 1993, p. 443). In particular, he 
believed that reduction functions have to express synthetic identities, like those between a 
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gene and a fragment of the DNA molecule coding for a protein or RNA in molecular 
biology (Schaffner 1976, pp. 614-615). 
 Schaffner’s version of the theory reduction is more appealing than the original 
model by Nagel because it is more realistic. It takes into account that the reduced theory 
often incorporates false statements. It also clarifies many concepts that have not been fully 
developed by Nagel.  
 Even though theory reduction by Schaffner was more realistic, it still faced some 
problems. One of the problems was that it focused on formal issues related to reduction, 
such as the logical form of reduction, rather than substantial issues. It was also limited by 
the fact that it considered relationship between theories rather than other epistemic units. 
Finally, it did not explicate the relation of strong analogy that was central to this model of 
reduction.  
 The above and other problems of theory reduction by Nagel and Schaffner 
prevented from their application to biology. In fact, there is a consensus in the field of 
philosophy of biology that reduction in the sense of theory reduction normally does not 
take place (Brigandt and Love 2008). Firstly, it is difficult (if not impossible) to reconstruct 
reasoning patterns in biology formally. Secondly, biology does not employ theories in the 
sense presupposed by theory reduction. Thirdly, biologists do not seem to bother to 
establish relationships of strong analogy between different epistemic domains to explain 
biological phenomena.  
 Even Schaffner, in his recent papers, admits that the requirements imposed on 
reduction by these early models were too stringent (2006). He proposes now that reduction 
in biology is fragmentary; it does not involve entire theories but rather simpler epistemic 
units such as models or representations of mechanisms. In addition, he suggests that 
biological explanations are usually interlevel in the sense that they incorporate elements of 
different scales (Schaffer 2006, p. 384). Indeed, as we have seen in the first part of the 
thesis, immunological explanations appeal to interactions between cells and molecules, 
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even though cells are themselves constituted by molecules and thus belong to a different 
scale than the molecules. For example, cytokines are said to change the behavior of cells 
and cells are said to release cytokines.  
 
Explanatory reduction: Wimsatt 
Problems of theory reduction inspired scholars to search for alternative notions of 
reduction. In particular, it became clear that the notion of reduction has to take into account 
relationships between epistemic units other than theories. The pioneer of this new way of 
thinking about reduction was William Wimsatt. For him, reduction was an explanation of 
higher-level entities in terms of the properties and relationships between lower-level 
entities. The lower-level entities are constituents of the higher level ones (Wimsatt 2007 
(1976), p. 249). Wimsatt rejected deductive-nomological account that appeals to 
explanations in terms of laws (Hempel and Oppehneim 1948). Instead, he took it for 
granted that scientific explanation may well appeal to causal mechanisms or causal factors 
(Wimsatt 2007 (1976), p. 249).   
  The idea of reduction by Wimsatt was inspired by Wesley Salmon’s statistical 
relevance model of explanation. This model is based on the intuition that only those 
properties that are statistically relevant are explanatory. Property C is statistically relevant 
to a property B if the probability of B given C and A is different from the probability of A: 
P(B|A.C) ≠ P(B|A). To put it simply, property C is statistically relevant and explanatory if 
it makes a difference (Salmon 1971).  
 Important for the Salmon’s account of explanation is the notion of homogenous 
partitioning. Roughly, property A is homogenously partitioned with respect to B if its 
subclasses (C1, C2, …, Cn) are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and no other statistically 
relevant partition of the subclasses can be made with respect to B. Intuitively, there should 
be no other factors statistically relevant to B than the factor under consideration. For 
example, partition of a reference class into smokers and non-smokers is homogenous with 
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respect to lung cancer, if no other factors are involved in the risk of developing this type of 
cancer (Papineau 1989).  
 The notion of homogenous partitioning helps to avoid Simpson’s paradox. 
Simpson’s paradox is one in which correlation between certain groups seems to be 
different when the groups are combined. One illustration is the case of Berkley university 
which was once accused of gender bias. The accusation was based on the fact that the 
percentage of women admitted to the university was found to be smaller than the 
percentage of admitted men. However, after homogenous partitioning of candidates into 
groups according to the faculty they were applying to, it became clear that there was no 
gender bias because women were choosing more competitive departments.  
 Another important notion in the statistical relevance model of explanation was 
“screening off”. Salmon introduced this notion to distinguish between cases of mere 
statistical correlation and causation. He gave the following example. Atmospheric pressure 
A explains the occurrence of the storm S. If this is the case, there must be a statistically 
relevant association between S and A. However, there appears to be also similar 
association between S and the reading of a barometer B. How do decide which property is 
explanatory, A or B? In order to solve this problem, one should note that P(S|A.B) = 
P(S|A) (B is not relevant to P) but P(S|A.B) ≠ P(S|B) (A is relevant to P). In this case A is 
said to screen off B.  
 Wimsatt applied the model of explanation by Salmon to reductive explanations. In 
reductive explanations, homogenous partitioning of the reference class is a partitioning of 
lower-level realizations that constitute a given phenomenon. Reductive explanation should 
be understood as demonstration of how a given phenomenon “is a product of causal 
interactions at lower levels” (Wimsatt 2007 (1976), p. 258). According to this 
interpretation, microstate C is explanatory in regard to the macro-state B if the probability 
of B given C and a macro-law A is different from the probability of the macro-law A.  
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 Thus, according to Wimsatt, there is no need of reduction if there is no deviation 
from regularity described by a macro law. For example, the ideal gas law can serve as a 
sound explanation of behavior of some concrete gas sample if this gas sample obeys this 
law. However, if we consider case of gas that does not obey the ideal gas law (there is 
some upper level anomaly), we have to appeal to lower level description to explain it. In 
the former case the probability of a macro-state given the macro-law is the same as the 
probability of the macro-state given the micro-state realization. In the latter case the 
probability of the macro-state given the macro-law is different than the probability of the 
macro-state given the micro-state realization. In this case, micro-state description screens 
off the macro-state description.  
 One should note that on the grounds of the statistical relevance model of 
explanation, a given property can be explanatory even if the probability of making a 
difference by this property is very small. This is a feature of the Salmon’s model that 
Wimsatt tried to improve. He argued that if the improvement in the characterization of the 
macro-state B by microstate description C in comparison with the macro-state description 
A is very small, than A effectively screens of C. Thus, even if C screens off A, A 
effectively screens off C. Another case in which A effectively screens off C is when the 
information provided by C is much more expensive to get than the information provided by 
A (Wimsatt 2007 (1976), p. 258). According to Wimsatt reduction occurs if C effectively 
screens off A.  
 There are many reasons why Wimsatt’s account of reduction can be considered as 
more appealing than the models of theory reduction. Firstly, it permits other relata of the 
reductionist relationship than theories and thus extends the range of possible applications. 
Secondly, the model of reduction by Wimsatt focuses more on substantial issues than 
formal ones.     
 Despite many advantages, Wimsatt’s model of reduction is still hard to accept 
because it is based on a controversial model of explanation. Many different arguments 
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have been put forward against statistical relevance model of explanation. For example, it 
has been argued that in biomedical sciences it is practically impossible to partition a 
reference class homogenously to compare difference-making power of various factors. It 
has also been suggested that the theory does not provide sufficient means to distinguish 
between correlation and causation (reviewed in: Woodward 2010).  
 In immunology, an explanation in terms of statistical relevance is not satisfactory. 
For example, finding that functional specialization of APCs in the intestine of mice 
depends on whether the mice come from Charles River Laboratory or Jackson Laboratory 
even though statistically relevant (Denning et al. 2011) is not by itself explanatory. An 
explanation would be provided if the causal factors responsible for the functional 
difference of APCs between these two groups of mice were given. Thus, crucial for 
immunological explanation is finding causal explanations for statistically relevant 
associations between properties involved in immunological processes.  
 
Explanatory reduction: Sarkar 
Sahotra Sarkar has developed a detailed model of reduction that seems to reflect the actual 
explanatory practice in life sciences (1998). He explicitly focused on substantial issues of 
reduction to deepen the understanding of explanation in classical genetics and molecular 
genetics.  
 His analysis of reduction is based on the intuition that many forms of reduction are 
explanations of wholes in terms of their parts (cf. Beatty 1990, p. 201-202). In addition, 
representations of the wholes are assumed to belong to a different epistemic domain than 
the representations of the constituent parts. Thus, by reducing the wholes to their parts, one 
makes a step towards unification of knowledge (Sarkar 1998, pp. 39-40). 
 These general observations about reduction lead Sarkar to distinguish between three 
features of reductionist explanations: fundamentalism, abstract hierarchy and spatial 
hierarchy. Fundamentalism is an appeal to more fundamental properties to explain some 
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phenomenon. For example, an adaptive immune response towards an antigen can be 
explained in terms of more fundamental process of clonal selection of antibodies. Abstract 
hierarchy means that a system to be explained is represented as hierarchical according to 
some criterion, but the lower levels are not necessarily mereological parts of the higher 
levels in the hierarchy. For example, it is commonly distinguished between four levels of 
protein structure, even though lower levels are not component parts of the higher levels. 
Even though the sequence of the amino acids (primary structure) determines specific 
pattern of hydrogen bonds (secondary structure), it is not, by itself, part of the pattern. 
Finally, spatial hierarchy is a representation of a system as being made up of compositional 
levels. That is, each lower level is assumed to be made up of parts of the higher level. For 
example, an organism can be considered as belonging to one level, cells that make up this 
organism can be considered as belonging to another level, molecules that constitute all of 
these cells can be considered as belonging to yet another level (Sarkar 1998, pp. 43-44).    
  The above three features of reductionist explanations, fundamentalism, abstract 
hierarchy and spatial hierarchy are used by Sarkar as criteria for distinguishing between 
five different types of reduction: weak reduction, approximate abstract hierarchical 
reduction, abstract hierarchical reduction, approximate strong reduction and strong 
reduction. Each of these different types of reduction satisfies one or more of the three 
criteria and some of these criteria can be satisfied only approximately. For example, weak 
reduction for Sarkar is a form of fundamentalist explanation that is neither abstract- 
hierarchical nor spatial- hierarchical explanation. For other types of reduction by Sarkar 
and the criteria they satisfy see table 2. 
 
Table 2 Types of reduction by Sarkar (1998, pp. 44-45)  
Criterion                      
 
Fundamentalism Abstract hierarchy Spatial hierarchy 
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Type of reduction 
Weak reduction Satisfied Not satisfied  Not satisfied 
Approximate 
abstract hierarchical 
reduction 
Approximately 
satisfied 
Satisfied Not satisfied 
Abstract hierarchical 
reduction 
Satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied 
Approximate strong 
reduction  
Approximately 
satisfied 
Satisfied Satisfied 
Strong reduction Satisfied Satisfied Satisfied 
 
All in all, the model of reduction by Sarkar provides a framework that allows one to 
classify various forms of reductionist explanations in biology according to the character of 
the representations involved in the explanation and the form of the relationship between 
these representations. Sarkar himself applied this framework to understand the character of 
explanation in classical genetics and molecular biology. He came to conclusion that 
classical genetics involves abstract hierarchical reductions and molecular biology involves 
spatial hierarchical reductions (1998). 
      
Explanatory reduction: Waters 
Kenneth Waters considers the problem of reduction in the context of the relationship 
between classical genetics and molecular genetics (1990; 1994). He points out that there is 
a  consensus according to which classical genetics is irreducible to molecular genetics. One 
reason why these two branches of genetics are considered irreducible is that the concept of 
gene employed by classical genetics seems to be radically different from the one in 
molecular genetics (Waters 1990, p. 126). 
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 However, according to Waters, the classical concept of gene is often misunderstood 
by many philosophers. For example, David Hull suggests that the relationship between 
genes and phenotypic features was considered as relatively simple and direct by classical 
geneticists (1994, p. 29). However, in fact, geneticists working at the beginning of the 
twentieth century were aware that a single phenotypic feature may be determined by many 
genes. They were also aware that a single gene may affect many different phenotypic 
features. Thus, against some interpretations, it was taken for granted in classical genetics 
that the relationship between genotype and phenotype was many-many and not one-one 
(Waters 1990, p. 129). In addition, genes were understood as abstract rather than concrete 
biochemical entities and no real attempt was made by classical geneticists to explain the 
contribution of genotype to the phenotype (Waters 1994, pp. 169-171).         
  Even though the material character of genes was not known, it was accepted in 
classical genetics that gene differences cause phenotypic differences. In other words, it  
was assumed that genes are difference-making factors. Since this general view of genes, as 
difference-makes, has not changed for a long time, it can be considered as a conceptual 
link connecting classical genetics with the modern, molecular genetics. Specific 
contribution of molecular genetics to the idea of gene was that it introduced molecular 
level understanding of it. All of this lead Waters to suggest that the relationship between 
classical genetics to molecular genetics is that of an explanatory reduction (Waters 1990; 
Waters 1994, pp. 182-184).   
 In his work on genetics, Waters does not define the notion of reduction explicitly. 
However, one can try to reconstruct this notion on the basis of his analysis of the 
relationship between classical genetics and molecular genetics. First of all, what Waters 
considers as a proof of reduction of classical genetics to molecular genetics is the fact that 
“the behavior of specific Mendelian genes has been explained by identifying them with 
relatively short segments of DNA which function as units to influence the course of 
chemical reactions within a biochemical system” (Waters 1990, p. 130). This fragment 
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seems to suggest that according to Waters reduction is an explanation by identification. 
Indeed, the intuitive cases of reduction such as “Water is H2O” or “Temperature is mean 
molecular energy” seem to be of that type. Another important feature of reductionist 
explanations according to Waters is a conceptual link between the reduced and the 
reducing level. For example, classical genetics and molecular genetics have been argued by 
Waters to be linked by fundamental assumptions about a gene, such as the one that says 
that gene is a phenotypic difference-maker. If there was no such conceptual link, the 
reduction of one level of understanding to another would be impossible (cf. Waters 1994). 
Finally, Waters allows other units of reductionist explanations than theories. In particular 
he considers reduction as a relationship between levels of understanding. By so doing, he 
rejects Nagel-Schaffner model of reduction and embraces a version of explanatory 
reduction. He also criticizes post-positivist emphasis on formal, syntactical aspects of 
reduction (Waters 1990, p. 130). 
Apart from applying an informal model of reduction to elucidate the relationship 
between classical genetics and molecular genetics, Waters also attempted to challenge 
some interpretations of the fundamental scientific aims of life sciences. In particular, he 
questioned a widespread philosophical view that research programs within biology apply, 
extend and validate some central theory. Indeed, it has often been suggested that classical 
genetics attempted to apply, extend and validate certain explanatory theory of gene 
transmission. However, detailed historical analysis made Waters to conclude that classical 
genetics rather aimed to study many different phenomena and the theory of inheritance and 
gene transmission served as means for advancing knowledge about these other phenomena. 
Thus, the central aim of classical genetics was not to explain inheritance patterns but, 
instead, it was an open-ended aim of developing new knowledge about many different 
phenomena by means of knowledge about inheritance patters (Waters 2004, p. 792). The 
observation that classical genetics was not focused on developing and testing one central 
theory is in agreement with an attempt of Waters and other authors to change the focus of 
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contemporary philosophy of science from theories to the actual investigative and 
explanatory patterns in life sciences. It also supports the view that reduction can be 
considered as a relationship between epistemic units other than theories (Waters 2004, p. 
807).      
  
Methodological reductionism  
Each model of reduction is an attempt to formulate the notion of reduction in the way that 
reflects the actual explanatory practice of science (in our case, biology). However, it is one 
thing to claim that a given domain of biological knowledge is reducible (in some sense) to 
another domain and another thing to actually pursue this kind of reduction. For example, 
we could easily imagine a person claiming that psychological studies of memory storage 
and retrieval are in principle reducible to neuroscience but the reduction should not be 
pursued because the potential benefits from such a reduction would be incomparably 
smaller than the effort that would have to be taken to actually execute it.  
 The idea according to which certain model of reduction should be followed as a 
fruitful explanatory practice is referred to as methodological reductionism (Brigand and 
Love 2008). For each model of epistemic reduction there is a methodological counterpart 
claiming that this particular version of the reduction should be followed.  
 
Selection of and motivation for the model of reduction that suits the case of immune 
recognition 
So far, we have described various models of epistemic reduction. We have distinguished 
between theory reduction and explanatory reduction. We have also mentioned 
methodological reductionism, a recommendation to apply certain form (or forms) of 
reduction in the scientific practice. Now, we are ready to choose and motivate the idea of 
reduction that may be considered against our own attempt to explain immune recognition 
in the first part of the thesis. 
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 First, consider theory reduction. We have already pointed out that there are serious 
obstacles to apply this version of reduction to biology in general. Theory reduction is based 
on the deductive-nomological account of explanation. From the point of view of this 
account, the explanandum is an event to be explained and the explanans are laws and 
conditions that precede the event in question (Hempel and Oppehneim 1948). Hempel and 
Oppenheim considered this model of explanation as ubiquitous in science. However, our 
account of immune recognition does not incorporate laws. Instead it appeals to 
generalizations of limited scope. For example, in our discussion of IBD we have 
emphasized that CD is often correlated with polymorphisms in the NOD2 gene. However, 
fewer than 20% of CD patients are homozygous for the NOD2 susceptibility gene variants 
(Podolsky 2002). On the top of that, there is no evidence for a correlation between NOD2 
polymorphisms and IBD in patients of Asian and African origin (Cho and Abraham 2007). 
Nevertheless, “The identification of NOD2 (CARD15) as a susceptibility gene for CD was 
a highly significant advance in our understanding of CD pathogenesis and in complex 
disease genetics as a whole” (Brant and McGovern 2005).  
 Hence, models of explanatory reduction seem to be better suited to our case. First 
consider the model of reduction by Wimsatt. We have already mentioned that this model of 
reduction can be applied to epistemic units other than theories. Thus, potentially, it can be 
applied to our account of immune recognition. However, problems with statistical 
relevance model of explanation prevent from considering the model of reduction by 
Wimsatt as correct representation of the explanatory practice in biology in general and 
immunology in particular.  
 Even if the statistical relevance model of explanation proved to be correct, there are 
still some fundamental problems that prevent from embracing Wimsatt’s model of 
reduction. In particular, it is not clear whether the version of reduction by this author is 
ontological or epistemic. Wimsatt writes that for him reduction is a relationship between 
levels of organization, features of the world. He emphasizes that higher levels of 
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organization are composed of lower level parts. (Wimsatt 2007 (1976), p. 249). All of this 
could suggest that Wimsatt focuses on ontological reduction rather than epistemic one. On 
the other hand, however, the levels of organization are defined by him in quasi-epistemic 
terms as “local maxima of regularity and predictability in the phase space of different 
modes of organization of matter” (Wimsatt 2007 (1976), p. 249). This peculiar fusion of 
ontology and epistemology is also present in the Wimsatt’s characterization of complex 
systems (Wimsatt 2007 (1994)). He claims that levels of organization are made up of 
patterns of causal networks. However, he also maintains that the very same levels (ones 
that are made up of causal patterns) are also special cases of perspectives that, he admits 
bluntly, have subjective character (cf. Wimsatt 2007 (1994), p. 200, 227, 229; Wimsatt 
2007, p. 358). Thus, perspectives for Wimsatt are ontological structures (cf. Wimsatt 2007 
(1994), p. 205) with subjective, epistemological features like “being from a point of view” 
(Wimsatt 2007 (1994), p. 222, 227). 
 Epistemic and ontological questions of reduction and reducibility of immune 
recognition can potentially give entirely different answers (Sarkar 1998, p. 22). Therefore, 
these two domains have to be carefully separated. As we have mentioned at the beginning 
of the thesis, immune recognition is taken to be metaphysically identical to molecular and 
cellular level processes. What is unsettled in our context is the question if our idea of 
immune recognition can be reduced to the knowledge of lower level processes. Since the 
model of reduction by Wimsatt does not distinguish sharply between levels of analysis and 
levels of organization, we cannot apply his model of reduction to our case. 
 Consider now the models of reduction by Waters and Sarkar. Waters applies a 
notion of reduction that is largely informal. For him reduction is an explanation by 
identification. In particular, what is identified in reduction are levels of understanding. At 
the first glance, or account of immune recognition is of that type. One level of 
understanding consists of our general observations regarding initial stages of immune 
activation. Another level is the level of detection modules. The third level is the level of 
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interacting cells and molecules. We have explained the immune recognition by identifying 
it, first with a dynamic network of detection modules and second, with a network of 
complex interactions between cells and molecules. An important ingredient of the notion 
of reduction by Waters is the need for a conceptual link between the reduced and the 
reducing level of understanding. What links together the systems level notion of immune 
recognition and the molecular level notion of the same process is the idea that they are 
involved in the calibration of an immune response and that they are in fact determinants of 
this response. Similarly as in the problem of genetics considered by Waters, the molecular 
notion of immune recognition somehow modifies the original, systems level notion, 
nevertheless there seems to be some core idea of immune recognition that is preserved in 
the molecular level and systems level analysis.  
   Also, the idea of explanatory reduction by Sarkar seems to be applicable to our 
example of immune recognition. As we have mentioned, for Sarkar, reduction includes 
explanations of wholes in terms of their constituent parts. In addition, the wholes and the 
parts are taken to belong to different epistemic domains. Our account of immune 
recognition seems to be of that type. Immune recognition is a complex process and 
interacting detection modules can be considered as parts of this process. Moreover, 
immune recognition is assumed to be explainable in terms of interaction between these 
modules. However, more complete explanation would be provided by an explanation in 
terms of interacting cells and molecules. This is because the interacting modules are 
constituted by nothing but cells and molecules and their interactions. Again, there is 
nothing at the level of modules and immune recognition itself that would not be non-
cellular or non-molecular. 
 
Conclusion 
In the above chapter, we have analyzed some of the most influential notions of reduction 
developed in philosophy of biology for the last 60 years. This analysis brought us to repeat 
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after many authors that the initial models of reduction, especially those concerned with 
theory reduction are not applicable to biological sciences. They have been developed in the 
context of physics and they invoke exceptionless laws and theories. In contrast, biological 
sciences do not employ theories in the sense presupposed by these early models (Kitcher 
1984). In addition they do not involve laws in the strict sense but rather generalizations of 
a limited scope. All of these fundamental problems in applying models of theory reduction 
to biology also prevent from considering them as reflections of immunological explanation 
of immune recognition in the first part of the thesis.  
 However, recent developments in the reductionist debate have come out with 
models of reduction that focus on the actual explanatory patterns in life sciences. 
Nevertheless, only those models that distinguish between ontological and epistemic aspects 
of reduction can be considered against our case of immune recognition. It is because 
questions about ontological and epistemic reducibility of immune  recognition could 
potentially give entirely different answers. At the first glance, our own attempt of immune 
recognition is well reflected by the notion according to which reduction is an explanation 
of one level in terms of another level.    
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Chapter II 
Reducibility of systems level understanding of 
biological phenomena 
 
In the first part of the thesis we emphasized need for systems level understanding of 
immune recognition. Here we clarify that there is nothing in this statement that would 
suggest that molecular and cellular level understanding of this process fails. Quite the 
contrary, systems level understanding is an understanding in terms of complex interactions 
between constituent cells and molecules.  
 Thus, taking into account some of the notions of reduction discussed in the previous 
chapter, we argue that there is a sense in which systems level understanding of immune 
recognition is reducible to molecular and cellular level understanding of this process. 
Indeed, we suggest here that reductionist explanations are ubiquitous in systems biology. 
This in turn brings us to realize that there is no fundamental methodological difference 
between systems biology and molecular biology. Indeed, as we shall see, the core 
explanatory approach of systems biology and molecular biology is similar. In particular, 
both branches of biology explain wholes in terms of their constituent parts and dynamic 
interactions between these parts. The difference lies in the extend of dynamic interactions 
and the number of parts that are included in the explanation. The observation that systems 
biology is no less reductionist than molecular biology will help us understand character of 
the postulated systems level approach to understanding immune recognition in the last 
chapter.   
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The idea of reduction in philosophy and systems biology 
The statement that systems level understanding of immune recognition reduces to 
molecular and cellular level understanding of this process might come as a surprise to 
some readers. We have spent a lot of time arguing for complexity of immune recognition 
to end up promoting reductionism about the recognition. Is not it self-contradiction?    
 Many biologists consider reductionist approach and systems approach as opposite. 
The reason is that they employ a different notion of reduction and non-reduction from a 
philosophical one. As we have seen, most philosophers understand reduction as a 
relationship between two domains of knowledge (one more fundamental than the other) 
such that the more fundamental domain is used to explain phenomena the other domain 
refers to (Brigandt and Love 2008). In contrast, biologists often understand reduction as a 
form of oversimplification: 
 
“By grasping simple causes, we free ourselves of the annoyance of the complex. Reductionism is 
the principle of replacing perplexity (complex questions) with what passes for understanding 
(simple answers)” (Cohen 2000, p. 11). 
 
“A major problem is that the reductionist approach can promote overly simple thinking, with a 
focus on the single connection under study that ignores the multiplicity of other influences 
impinging on the pathway in question and the modulation of distant network properties when the 
chosen element is manipulated” (Benoist et al. 2006). 
 
“Biological systems are extremely complex ... The reductionist approach—although successful in 
the early days of molecular biology—underestimates this complexity ... ” (Van Regenmortel 2001, 
p. 1016). 
 
More specifically, biologists often understand reduction as an explanation of a complex 
biological phenomenon in terms of isolated, individual parts without taking into account 
complex interactions between these parts.  
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“Biology has traditionally followed reductionist approach in which individual components of a 
living system are studied separately. It is becoming clear that we need to reverse the process and 
to study how these components interact to form complex systems using an integrative approach” 
(Palsson 2000, p. 1147) (Emphasis mine).  
 
“In the reductionist approach, researchers attempted to understand a complex entity (e.g. a cell, an 
organ or a disease) by breaking it down into smaller, more tractable units for study, such as genes, 
complexes or pathways. The reductionist approach was characterized by the concept that a system 
is the sum of its parts and simply identifying and characterizing these parts would be sufficient to 
generate predictions about the system’s behavior” (Gardy et al. 2009, p. 251). 
 
“It became apparent that a holistic rather than a reductionism approach for understanding in 
biology is imperative: not only how many genes there are or even how they are connected but how 
they interact to result in observed behaviour of the overall system” (Mesarovic et al. 2004, p. 19). 
 
Thus, in the light of the discussion in the previous chapter, reduction in the biological 
sense appears to be a subcategory of reduction in the philosophical sense. Explanatory 
reduction says that a representation of higher level phenomena can be explained by a 
representation of lower level phenomena (Brigandt and Love 2008). This also includes 
cases considered by systems biologists when higher level phenomena are explained in 
terms of single molecular parts or many static individual parts.   
 The philosophical concept of reduction is broader because it embraces not only 
cases of explanation in simple terms but also explanations in complex terms. Indeed, as we 
shall see, many philosophers accuse reductionist approaches for making things too 
complicated (cf. “gory details” objection against reductionism by Kitcher 1984, cf. also 
discussion in Waters 1990). All in all, biological concept of epistemic reduction is 
narrower than the similar concept in philosophy.  
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 What about the corresponding ideas of non-reduction, such as holism and 
emergence? Are these concepts also understood by biologists differently? Analysis of 
systems biology literature reveals that these non-reductionist concepts often fall under the 
scope of the concepts of reduction in philosophy. For example, the idea of emergence in 
systems biology includes many forms of epistemic reduction in the philosophical sense. 
Systems biologists often understand emergence as unpredictability or unexplainability of 
the whole on the basis of the knowledge of isolated, individual parts;  
 
“The holistic approach is based on the idea that complex wholes cannot be understood by a study 
of the isolated parts. It is argued that when many components are put together, especially with 
interactions that are nonlinear, there are new emergent properties which can only be 
comprehended in the context of the whole system” (Brenner 2010, p. 208) (Emphasis mine). 
 
“Complex systems display properties, often called ‘emergent properties’ that are not demonstrated 
by their individual parts and cannot be predicted even with the full understanding of the parts 
alone” (Zak and Aderem 2009, p. 265) (Emphasis mine).   
 
“Significant efforts are underway to understand key pathway and organism-level responses by 
relying on the emergent properties of global gene and protein expression data (that is, the 
properties of the system as a whole that cannot be predicted from the parts)” (Butcher et al. 2004, 
p. 1254). 
 
So understood concepts of emergence are broad enough to incorporate not only 
corresponding philosophical concepts but also many ideas of epistemic reduction that 
require a whole to be explained in terms of many parts and interactions between these 
parts. Emergence in philosophy means something different. It is often defined as “a failure 
of any possible explanation of a whole in terms of its parts and their relations” (Schaffner 
2006, p. 382) (emphasis mine). This failure can have different sources, which is illustrated 
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by a diversity of various philosophical stances about reduction (cf. Bedau and Humphreys 
2007). 
All things considered, the concept of epistemic reduction in biology is narrower 
than the similar concept in philosophy. On the other hand, anti-reductionist concepts in 
biology such as holism or emergence are understood broader by biologists and incorporate 
cases of reduction considered by many philosophers. In the remaining part of this chapter 
we focus on the actual method of systems biology to understand if it is only the concept or 
also the actual practice of systems biology that can be considered reductionist from a 
philosophical point of view. 
 
Methodology of molecular biology and systems biology 
As we have seen, systems biologists and philosophers of biology tend to understand 
concepts of reduction and non-reduction in different ways. We have seen that instances of 
explanations in terms of complex interactions between parts of a given process are often 
considered as anti-reductionist by biologists. On the other hand, the same types of 
explanations are often considered as hardcore reductionist by some philosophers. How 
does this understanding of “reduction” and “non-reduction” translates into the actual 
practice of biology?  
 Systems biology promises to give an antireductionist account of biological systems. 
It also promises to explain how emergent properties arise in these systems (Zak and 
Aderem 2009). Here we look at the actual practice of systems biology to understand if 
systems biologists really mean methodological antireductionism (in the philosophical 
sense) when they insist on the antireductionist approach. In order to understand it, we shall 
compare systems biology approach with molecular biology approach because systems 
approach is often represented as reductionist by systems biologists and contrasted with the 
systems approach that is allegedly non-reductionist (or even anti-reductionist). 
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Methodological approach of molecular biology (a case study) 
Systems biologists often distance themselves from molecular biologists by claiming that 
their aim is to understand the structure and dynamics of biological systems. They promise 
to provide an explanation of how parts of a system dynamically interact to give rise to 
various systemic properties (Kitano 2002). Is this aim of systems biology truly different 
from the one of molecular biology? It appears that molecular biologists also attempt to 
provide an account of the structure and dynamics of biological systems. They also try to 
explain how parts of a system dynamically interact to give rise to systemic properties (even 
though they do not label these properties as “systemic”) (cf. De Backer et al. 2010 pp. 34, 
40).  
 Molecular biology is sometimes represented as an enterprise whose aim is to 
catalogue biological parts (Powell 2004) or to analyze complex phenomena in terms of 
single or static molecular constituents (Noble 2008; Smaglik 2000, p. 828). However, even 
if molecular biologists sometimes catalogue parts they do so only to provide a dynamic 
explanation of how these parts interact to give rise to a given phenomenon. It is impossible 
to study interactions between molecules without first constructing a library of molecular 
components, interactions and responses (Ideker 2004). Systems biology itself contributes 
to this step by helping to complete the list of molecular components and responses (Ge et 
al. 2003) and by providing a catalogue of molecular interactions (Milo et al. 2002).    
 In order to see how molecular biology explains systemic processes in terms of 
molecules and their dynamic interactions consider molecular studies of classical 
conditioning in a marine sea slug, Aplysia. Classical conditioning is a kind of learning in 
which an animal learns to associate weak conditioned stimulus (CS) with a strong 
unconditioned one (US). After repeated, sequential activation of CS and US, the response 
to the conditioned stimulus is significantly enhanced in Aplysia. This process of learning is 
systemic in the sense that it is constituted by the whole system of interacting molecular 
parts. 
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  Classical conditioning in Aplysia has been studied in a neural circuit consisting of 
two sensory neurons (one receiving information about CS from the siphon and one 
receiving information about US from the tail), a facilitating interneuron and a motor 
neuron. Molecular components of the process of learning include ions, ion channels, 
neurotransmitters, genes, receptors, transcription factors, protein kinases and many other. 
The dynamics between molecular constituents jointly contributing to the process of 
learning is the following. CS applied to the siphon leads to an increase in the ﬂow of Ca2+ 
ions into the sensory neuron innervating the siphon. The ions bind to the intracellular 
protein called calmodulin. Activated Ca
2+
/calmodulin binds to adenylyl cyclase (AC), 
which is an enzyme converting ATP into the second messenger cAMP. Importantly, 
binding of Ca
2+
/calmodulin to AC potentiates its response to serotonin. Now, if an 
unconditioned stimulus is applied to the tail, facilitating interneurons are activated. They 
use serotonin as their neurotransmitter. When released by the presynaptic neuron, serotonin 
binds to the receptors embedded in the membrane of the postsynaptic sensory neuron. This 
in turn leads to an increase in the activation of AC (Fig. 5B). Since activation of AC has 
already been increased by the conditioned stimulus, the response of AC to serotonin will 
become much greater than the one that could be produced if no conditioned stimulus was 
previously applied. The enhanced activation of AC further augments the production of 
cAMP molecules. cAMP binds to the regulatory subunit of the protein kinase A (PKA), 
causing it to release its active catalytic subunit.  
The active, catalytic subunit of PKA acts along several biochemical pathways. 
During long-term training, PKA recruits mitogen activated protein kinase (MAPK), and 
they both translocate into the nucleus. PKA phosphorylates a transcription factor called 
CREB-1 (cAMP response binding protein-1) which binds to promoter elements CRE, thus 
inducing a transcription of genes coding for proteins important for neurotransmitter release 
and the synthesis of new synaptic connections (Kandel 2001). As one can see, adenylyl 
cyclase responds to both the molecular representation of a conditioned stimulus 
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(Ca
2+
/calmodulin binding) and the representation of an unconditioned stimulus (the 
activation of G protein after a pulse of serotonin). Thus at the molecular level, adenylyl 
cyclase establishes association between representations of the two stimuli: conditioned and 
unconditioned ones (Kandel 2000, pp. 1247–1279). 
 
 
Figure 5. Classical conditioning in Aplysia from a molecular point of view. 
 
As the above example suggests, molecular biology studies of classical conditioning are not 
based on the analysis molecular constituents in isolation. They are not limited to 
cataloguing molecular parts involved in the learning process. Instead, they explain how 
molecular components and their dynamic interactions constitute the process. (The 
explanation includes various temporal and kinetic aspects of the process). In addition, 
molecular studies often do not limit themselves to explanation in terms of molecules 
exclusively. They make reference to organized aggregates of molecules such as aggregates 
of cells (e.g. neural circuits), cells (e.g. neurons) and organelles (e.g. cell nuclei). All in all, 
taking into account the aims of molecular biology and its actual explanatory practice it 
would be unfair to claim that it applies reductionist approach in the sense defined by 
systems biologists. As we have seen, systems biologists define reductionist approaches as 
attempts to explain complex phenomena in terms of single, static, isolated constituents. 
However, many examples of molecular biology explanations appear to deny this claim.     
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 If molecular biology and systems biology share their aims and adopt the same 
general strategy (explanation of complex phenomena in terms of molecular parts and their 
dynamic interactions), what is a difference between these two fields? The answer seems to 
be that systems biology attempts to take into account more molecular parts and more 
dynamic interactions than molecular biology (this includes also forms of dynamic 
interactions that have not been fully recognized so far). To achieve this end, systems 
biologists apply high-throughput technologies, computational tools and computer-aided 
models (Ideker 2004). These models are based on molecular data and their ultimate aim is 
to refine and complete missing molecular data (Palsson 2000).  
 
Methodological approach of systems biology (a case study) 
So far we have argued that from the point of view of its aims and aspirations, systems 
biology is no less reductionist from molecular biology. The difference is in the scope and 
the form of research methods. Systems biologists do not differ from molecular biologists 
when they claim that “To understand how a particular system functions, we must first 
examine how the individual components dynamically interact during operation” (Kitano 
2002, p. 1662).  Now, we shall look more closely at two representative studies in systems 
biology to see how this reductionist agenda works in practice.  
 The study of galactose utilization pathway in yeast by Ideker et al. (2001) is iconic 
of systems approach. The galactose pathway is a metabolic pathway that converts 
galactose into glucose-6-phosphate. The pathway is an example of a genetic regulatory 
switch because enzymes needed for catabolism of galactose are expressed only in the 
presence of this sugar (and in the absence of repressing sugars such as glucose). In their 
experimental work, the authors deleted single genes coding for individual components of 
the pathway to study the effects of these deletions on the transcription and translation of 
other genes. They have discovered that a single perturbation of the pathway (single 
deletion of a gene coding for a molecular constituent of the pathway in the presence or 
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absence of galactose) changes transcription of almost 1000 other genes. This observation 
confirmed the model of molecular interactions previously elaborated by molecular 
biologists and helped to get an insight into previously unknown molecular processes that 
regulate the pathway.   
 To obtain these results, the authors applied a systems approach. They designed this 
approach to consist of the following four consecutive steps. The first step is to “define all 
of the genes in the genome and the subset of genes, proteins, and other small molecules 
constituting the pathway of interest. If possible define an initial model of molecular 
interactions” (Ideker et al. 2001, p. 929). The second step is to perturb the pathway by 
single gene knock-outs and measure the level of mRNA and protein responses. The third 
step is to compare the results of mRNA and protein expression measurement with the 
available model of molecular interactions. The fourth step is to formulate new molecular 
hypotheses to explain phenomena unpredictable by the original model (Ideker et al. 2001; 
Ideker 2004).  
 Another representative example of systems biology studies is modeling of the 
dynamics of the MAPK pathway by Schoeberl et al. (2002). In general, the authors 
developed a computational model that reconstructs signaling cascade downstream of EGF 
(epidermal growth factor) receptor. This allowed them to formulate testable predictions 
that have confirmed the accuracy of the model.  
 MAPK signaling pathway is one of the most fundamental signaling cascades in 
mammals. It is involved in many different functions including development and tumor 
progression. The consecutive events in the pathway have been well characterized in 
molecular biology. Before the studies, 94 molecular components have been identified and 
described and many complex relationships between these components have been analyzed 
at the biochemical level. This also includes the studies of individual phosphorylation steps.   
 One of the aims of the mathematical model by Schoeberl et al. was to deepen the 
understanding of the kinetics of the signaling network. What was meant by the kinetics of 
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the pathway was the change in concentration of the individual components of the pathway 
over time following the receptor activation within one cell. The model provided 
mathematical tools to measure this change. Modeling required making use of around 100 
differential equations. The accuracy of the model was confirmed by experimental 
verification of the predictions formulated within the model about the concentration of 
phosphorylated ERK1/2 (one of the components of the pathway) and the level of 
expression of c-fos (the gene whose expression is controlled by the pathway).   
 As the above examples indicate, systems biologists exactly as molecular biologists, 
explain complex phenomena in terms of their parts and their interactions. As in reaction 
engineering, thus also in systems biology, components of chemical reaction, their dynamic 
features, topology and interactions between components are determined by a detailed 
empirical observations (cf. Sorger 2005). Systems biology helps to give a broader picture 
of life processes on the basis of this knowledge.   
 The study of galactose utilization pathway was based on the model of the pathway 
already elaborated by molecular biologists. It also required deletions of individual genes 
and thus interventions at the molecular level. The effects of these perturbations on 
individual components of the pathway have been observed and compared with the initial 
conceptual model. Also the study by Schoeberl et al. is entirely dependent on the detailed 
molecular knowledge. The authors based their model on the information about each 
molecular component of the pathway and the knowledge about biochemical reactions 
between interacting molecules (2002, fig. 1). This information as well as kinetic 
parameters were derived from the molecular biology literature and from published time-
dependent quantitative observations (2002, p. 373-374). They integrated all these pieces of 
data to develop a model of the pathway.    
 The observation that systems biologists build models on the basis of molecular data 
in order to complete missing molecular data suggests that no emergent biological 
properties in a strong philosophical sense are foreseen. Strongly emergent properties are 
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those that are in principle unpredictable on the basis of molecular level knowledge (cf. 
Bedau 2002, Chalmers 2006). The idea that the aim of systems biology is to understand 
and predict emergent properties of a system on the basis of a knowledge of interactions 
between all elements (Ahn et al. 2006; Hood and Perlmutter 2004, p. 1215; Hood et al. 
2004, p. 640) suggests that systems biologists do not understand emergence in the strong 
ontological sense. Instead, they seem to embrace the idea of  weakly emergent properties, 
unpredictable and unexplainable on the basis of molecular level knowledge except by 
simulation (Bedau 2002). Timothy Galinski from the Institute of Systems Biology says 
“I’m interested in having the computer do that to get me quickly and systematically to a 
level in the data where I can extract insights [about the system]” (Powell 2004, p. 302). A 
derivation of weakly emergent properties require knowledge of all micro-facts of the 
system that constitute this property. There is no short-cut in a molecular level explanation 
that would be used to predict accurately the behavior of the system: “The behavior of 
weakly emergent systems cannot be determined by any computation that is essentially 
simpler than the intrinsic natural computational process by which the system’s behavior is 
generated” (Bedau 2002; cf. also Bedau 2008). Thus many biologists argue that it will be 
impossible to simulate and model biological processes accurately until each individual 
component of the system is identified and its local interactions precisely determined 
(Palsson 2000, p. 1148; Sorger 2005, p. 10). We shall return to this issue later.   
 All things considered, systems biologists take it for granted that once knowledge of 
molecular parts and their dynamic interactions is completed, all other features of a 
biological system will be derived from this knowledge in one way or another (Kitano 
2002). It becomes clear that what systems biologists mean by an antireductionist, holistic 
approach should rather be considered as a thoroughly reductionist stance from a 
philosophical perspective (Kellenberger 2004, p. 547). “Just as traditional molecular 
biologists were reductionists without being sure of what reductionism entailed, so are these 
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systems biologists similarly holists by declaration rather than practice” (Gatherer 2010, p. 
7).   
 
Systems biology approach does not meet philosophical requirements for an 
antireductionist approach 
Methodological reductionism is the idea that “biological systems are most fruitfully 
studied at the lowest possible level” (Brigandt and Love 2008). (In the case of cell biology 
and immunology it is the level of cells and molecules). This definition is broad enough to 
include not only structural parts of a system but also their interactions. From this point of 
view, systems biology approach trying to explain systems level phenomena in terms of 
molecules and their interactions can be classified as a methodological reductionism.  
 Methodological reductionism in the sense defined above has often been subject of 
criticism by philosophers of biology and mind. Now, we shall try to understand arguments 
against this approach. We shall also try to get an insight about the conditions that are 
expected to be met by an approach to count as antireductionist. This will help us to 
understand what is missing from the systems biology approach that it falls under the 
philosophical category of methodological reductionism.  
 For many philosophers of biology, reductionist approach is biased by its focus on 
irrelevant details. For example, Hilary Putnam formulated an interesting argument against 
methodological reductionism in the context of philosophy of mind. This argument is also 
sometimes invoked in the context of philosophy of biology (e.g. Kitcher 1984; Rosenberg 
1994; 2007; Sober 1999). Putnam starts with the observation that the following statement 
is often taken for granted: “If materialism is true, one should seek for physical explanation 
of everything”. He gives the following example to argue that this statement is wrong. 
Imagine a cubical peg that can pass through a square hole but not though a circle hole. In 
principle there are two ways in which one could attempt to explain why the peg cannot 
pass through the circle hole. The first strategy is to provide a detailed explanation of this 
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situation in molecular terms, in terms of a rigid lattice of atoms, electrical potential energy 
and so on. The second strategy is to ignore the details and focus on the higher level 
structure. This strategy would explain why the peg cannot pass through the hole by making 
reference to the geometry of the peg and the hole and their rigidity. According to Putnam it 
is only the second explanation that brings out the “relevant structural features of the 
situation” and therefore counts as an explanation. The first one is either a “terrible 
explanation” or “no explanation”.  
 Is not it a matter of subjective opinion and the explanatory context whether the 
second explanation is better than the first one? (cf. similar discussion in Rosenberg 2007). 
According to Putnam, the non-reductionist explanation is better objectively. The reason is 
that the second explanation is more general than the first one and there is a rule in science 
according to which “an explanation is superior if it is more general” (Putnam 1975, p. 132). 
This putative rule stems from the fact that the science looks for laws.  
 In line with the arguments by Putnam, Philip Kitcher has argued that molecular 
explanation of why genes on non-homologous chromosomes assort independently in 
principle fails. According to him, this kind of explanation, if provided, would require 
making reference to irrelevant details. This detailed explanation would blur and disguise 
relatively simple facts of cytology, such that chromosomes line up with their homologues 
during meiosis. It would also decrease explanatory power of the simpler, more 
straightforward cytological story according to which genes on non-homologous 
chromosomes assort independently because these chromosomes are transmitted 
independently at meiosis (Kitcher 1984, pp. 347-348).  
 From the point of view of Kitcher, an antireductionist approach is characterized by 
the capacity to ignore gory molecular details to explain a biological process. This power to 
ignore irrelevant details is crucial in explaining various biological processes. Indeed, the 
antireductionist approach appears to be a good explanatory strategy in many contexts. For 
example, an explanation of price drop of beer in a supermarket does not require making 
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references to molecular processes in a sales manager’s brain. Indeed, it many contexts 
(especially in everyday ones), the ability to ignore details is crucial for understanding and 
communication. However, systems biology is not one of these contexts. For systems 
biology no molecular detail of a biological process is irrelevant (Hood and Perlmutter 
2004, p. 1215; Ideker 2004, p. 2738). In fact, a detailed knowledge of the components is a 
starting point for a systems biology study (Powell 2004, p. 300; Strange 2005, p. C968; De 
Backer et al. 2010, pp. 19, 40). According to the founder of the Institute for Systems 
Biology, Leroy Hood “Systems biology defines and analyses the interrelationships of all of 
the elements in a functioning system in order to understand how the system works” (quote 
after Mesarovic et al. 2004, p. 19; Hood et al. 2004, p. 640). Zak and Aderem define 
systems biology as “the comprehensive and quantitative analysis of the interactions 
between all components of biological systems over time” (Zak and Aderem 2009, p. 264) 
Thus the aim of systems biology can be defined as an attempt to link detailed molecular 
knowledge with higher level properties: “Ultimate goal of biology is to understand every 
detail of and principle of biological systems… Systems biology… links the behaviors of 
molecules to system characteristics and function” (Kitano 2001, p. 1).  
 Apart from those who claim that reductionist approach unnecessarily complicates 
things, there are also those who claim that it exceedingly simplifies things (Dupré 1993, pp. 
87-88; Powell and Dupré 2009; Wimsatt 1985). Contrary to appearance, there may be no 
contradiction between these two claims. Reductionist approach, even the one, 
philosophically understood, can be considered as complicating one aspect of reality while 
simplifying another one. According to Powell and Dupré “At the core of all accounts of 
reductionism lies a seductive vision of the simplicity of phenomena. … Any one approach, 
or any exclusive focus on one ontological level (in so far, indeed, as there really are such 
things) will almost certainly be inadequate to all aspects of the task” (2009, p. 62).  There 
are reasons to believe that biological systems are hierarchically organized and a 
reductionist approach gives a simplified outlook by focusing on one level and only one 
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level of reality. In addition, there seem to be distinctly systemic aspects of biological 
processes that cannot get a proper treatment from the molecular perspective. This is why 
O’Malley and Dupré (2005) call for a systems theoretic approach in systems biology. An 
approach that would perceive biological systems as systems and would emphasize system 
principles. Similarly Mesarovic et al. complain that systems biology uses only a fraction of 
the concepts and results of system theory (2004). Also Cornish-Bowden et al. claim that 
“systems biology” is “often little more than a euphemism for gathering ever more details 
on an ever larger scale” (2004, p. 713).  
 Above, we have seen that methodological reductionism is often criticized for its 
focus on irrelevant details, its lack of explanatory power or ignorance of higher levels of 
organization. However, the most powerful argument against methodological reductionism 
is the multiple realizability argument. It has been invoked in many versions and contexts 
by many authors including Putnam, Kitcher, Fodor. According to this argument, the same 
functional role can be realized by a diversity of molecular processes and therefore studying 
these roles at the molecular level would lead to an unmanageable disjunction of 
alternatives. Methodological reductionism would unavoidably overlook what these 
different disjunctions have in common (cf. Rosenberg 2007). Thus, for example, if 
somebody attempted to provide an extremely detailed molecular explanation of antigen 
presentation in terms of chemical bonds and physical forces, the person would run the risk 
of overlooking other ways the presentation can be performed by means of other kinds of 
APCs, other classes of major histocompatibility complex (MHC) molecules and other 
kinds MHC molecules within each class, other configurations of the antigen, other forces 
and so on and so forth. Even if the person collected data about the exact molecular 
interactions involved in each particular instance of the antigen presentation to cover all 
possible instances of antigen presentation the person would overlook what all of them have 
in common. All of it implies, that one should ignore the gory details and remain at the 
cytological level of analysis. This is how the argument goes or so.  
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 There is no doubt that most (if not all) higher-level biological properties are 
multiple realizable at the molecular level. Cell organelles, genomes, gene assortments, 
antigen presentations, immune recognitions, all can be supported by different molecular 
constituents and different molecular interactions. In fact, finding two identical cell 
organelles or genomes is as unlikely as finding two identical fingerprints. Nevertheless, 
molecular studies of both the genomes and the organelles allowed to formulate many 
Nobel prize-winning generalizations (e.g. The discovery of the structure of the ribosome, 
decoding the DNA sequence and so on). We have already seen how systems biologists 
formulated generalizations about galactose utilization pathway and MAPK pathway 
despite the fact that the exact components of these pathways and the amino acid sequences 
of these components can vary.  
 As the above discussion indicates, at least one of the following conditions have to 
be met by a scientific method to be considered antireductionist.  
 
 It must focus on higher level properties and their causal roles while ignoring some 
lower level details even though the higher level properties are ontologically 
reducible (metaphysically identical) to the lower level properties.  
 It must identify and include in the explanation those higher level properties and 
their interactions that are ontologically irreducible to (metaphysically distinct from) 
the lower level properties and their interactions.  
 It must be able to identify instances of the same natural higher level type, even 
though these instances appear heterogeneous from the lower level perspective. 
 
As we have argued above, systems biology does not meet these requirements and therefore 
does not adopt methodological antireductionism in the sense defined above. We can repeat 
after De Backer et al. that “methodological reductionism is methodologically maintained in 
systems biology” and that “the richness of system’s biology practice … shows the 
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flexibility and strength of the ‘reductionist paradigm’” (2010, pp. 40, 41). We are not going 
to evaluate this approach here. It should be obvious however, at this stage, that the aptness 
of this approach depends on whether there are relevant aspects of a biological system 
activity that cannot be derived from the most complete knowledge about the molecular 
level details even in principle.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
The above analysis of various concepts of reduction and non-reduction led us to conclude 
that the idea of systems biology approach falls under the philosophical concept of 
methodological reductionism. We have also argued that it is not only the concept but also 
the actual practice of systems biology that can be considered as reductionist from a certain 
point of view. How to reconcile this latter observation with the arguments of those who 
believe that systems biology will explain the behavior of parts in terms of the whole? (cf. 
Gilbert and Sarkar 2000; Cornish-Bowden 2004).  
According to Gilbert and Sarkar, “we are now at the point where the bottom-up 
approach is meeting the top-down approach” (2000, p. 7). Throughout their paper, the 
authors emphasize the need for this top-down approach, which they call “organicism”. 
They argue that complex biological systems cannot be explained in terms of their parts and 
their properties. Instead their explanation requires making reference to upper-level factors.  
 At first glance, the idea of top-down approach by Gilbert and Sarkar seems to go up 
against methodological reductionism. After all, methodological reductionism always insists 
on lower-level explanation, not on some upper-level one (Brigandt and Love 2008). 
However, what do the authors mean by the upper-level? Closer look at the argument by 
Gilbert and Sarkar helps to understand that the upper-level they make reference to is just 
the context of the system (in particular, the environmental context): “When we try to 
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explain how the whole system behaves we have to talk about the context of the whole and 
cannot get away talking only about parts. This philosophical stance is variously called 
wholism, holism, or organicism” (2000, p. 1). Association of the upper level with the 
environmental context is also evident in the statements like: “the upper level (the 
environment) selects the phenotype” (2000).  
 Is the need to embrace the environment in an explanation sufficient to reject 
methodological reductionism in biology? There are versions of methodological 
reductionism clearly incompatible with this claim (e.g. unifactorialism). However, 
methodological reductionism, broadly understood, only requires an explanation to be in 
lower-level terms (Brigandt and Love 2008). Thus, methodological reductionism is 
perfectly safe if the environment the explanation refers to is lower-level. 
 The examples of top-down biological explanations by Gilbert and Sarkar help to 
realize that the environment they appeal to is indeed lower level rather than higher level. 
What has been cited as an example of top-down influence calling for top-down explanation 
is the process of generation of lymphocyte antigen receptors (2000, p. 6). This process 
allows the immune system to generate antigen receptors that can recognize any foreign 
antigen. It is clear that antigen receptors cannot be encoded in full in the genome because 
human genome contains around 3x10
4
 genes and the antigen receptors can recognize 10
11  
different antigens (Janeway et al. 2005, p. 136). Susumu Tonegawa discovered that DNA 
codes for separate segments (fragments) of lymphocyte receptor molecules (Tonegawa 
1983). There are different types of these segments and they are located on different 
chromosomes. During the development of a lymphocyte, antigen receptor gene segments 
are joined together in different combinations. This process is coordinated by recombinase 
protein complex which includes products of recombination-activating genes and DNA-
modifying proteins. Further events in the process of the antigen receptor generation 
involve terminal deoxynucleotidyl transferase (TdT) and, in the case of the B-cells, 
activation induced cytidine deaminase (AID). In a nutshell, the process of generation of 
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antigen receptors involves complex chemical interactions between various enzymes and 
the DNA molecule. The enzymes act in concert to produce nucleolytic cleavage of the 
DNA in places marked by conserved sequence signal motifs, rearrange the DNA fragments, 
reconstitute the chromosome and generate more diversity by subtracting, adding and 
replacing nucleotides.  
 Taking into account the example of antigen receptors generation, we have to agree 
with Gilbert and Sarkar that “in situations such as these context is all important” (p. 6). 
However, we also have to realize that this context is molecular though and trough. As we 
have seen, all the events of antigen receptor gene generation take place at the same 
(molecular) level. (Apparently, no extra-molecular factor is involved in the process of 
antigen receptor generation). The same can be said about other examples by Gilbert and 
Sarkar.  
 All in all, the arguments by Gilbert and Sarkar do not seem to provide the case for 
upper-level explanation. Instead, they emphasize the importance of lower-level context. 
Indeed, limitations of the experimental setup in molecular biology do not allow to include 
many aspects of the context. We fully agree with the authors that emerging new techniques 
such as high-throughput technologies will allow one to broaden the view of the context and 
thus provide more adequate explanation of biological development.  
 Similarly, Denis Noble emphasizes the importance of higher level approach in 
biology in general and in systems biology in particular. What he means by this approach is 
the need to perceive a behavior of molecular parts in the context of its relationship to other 
levels of biological world organization. In particular, one has to take into account the 
influence of higher level phenomena on the lower level phenomena (downward causation 
or feedback control of a lower level by the higher level). On the other hand however, he 
admits that “the concept of level in biology is metaphorical” and that “there is no literal 
sense in which genes and proteins lie underneath cells, tissues and organs” (2008, p. 21). 
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Thus, in the literal sense, there is only one level at which causation operates and the higher 
levels should be understood as in Gilbert and Sarkar as the proximal same-level influences.  
 As an example of downward causation from an organism to DNA, Noble gives 
“methylation of cytosine bases and control of by interactions with the tails of histones 
around which the DNA is wound” (p. 19). Both processes have been described in 
molecular terms in the literature and do not require making reference to irreducible non-
molecular factors (Cedar and Bergman 2009). Such reference would be required if the 
processes were instances of interaction between two distinct ontological levels. Another 
example of a feedback between a higher-level property and a lower-level property is the 
dependence of the kinetics of the ion channels activation on the cell potential. In this case 
it is not clear why and in which sense cell potential is qualified as a higher level property 
and not as the same level property as the kinetics of the channel. If the cell potential is at a 
higher level than the kinetics of an ion channel it cannot be in a mereological sense 
because the channel kinetics is not part of the potential. A given cell potential seems to be 
causally determined rather than supervenient upon the kinetics of the channel.   
  
Conclusions 
One striking conclusion from our analysis in this chapter is that philosophers and systems 
biologists often understand reductionism and antireductionism in quite different ways. In 
fact, what is meant by methodological antireductionism in systems biology is a brand of 
methodological reductionism in philosophy.  
 Systems biology declares itself as an antireductionist alternative to molecular 
biology. However, from a certain philosophical perspective, systems biology is a deeply 
reductionist approach. The difference is that systems biology attempts to provide 
explanation of phenomena whose complexity was an obstacle for traditional molecular 
studies. Traditional molecular studies can focus only on the analysis of few molecular parts 
99 
 
and their local interactions. Instead, system biology applies methods having potential to 
embrace more parts and more interactions to explain complex phenomena.  
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Chapter III 
 
Reducibility of systems level understanding of 
immune recognition  
 
So far we have analyzed some of the most influential notions of reduction in philosophy of 
biology. We have also distinguished between philosophical and biological notions of 
reduction and argued that, from a philosophical point of view, standard approach in 
systems biology counts as reductionist. In particular, systems biology seeks for 
explanations of complex biological phenomena at the lower, molecular and cellular levels.   
 We have also mentioned that our own account of immune recognition seems to be 
reductionist. In the present chapter we try to understand sense in which systems level 
understanding of immune recognition is reducible to molecular and cellular level 
understanding of this process. This analysis will reveal that our representation of immune 
recognition is not reducible to the actual representation of the actual molecular and cellular 
processes. Instead, it is reducible to the approximation of these processes. This observation 
may help to understand the character of  reductionist explanations in biology in general.     
 
Systems level account of immune recognition is reductionist 
As we have already mentioned, many different models of reduction have been formulated 
for the last 60 years. Some of these models, especially those formulated in the context of 
post-positivist philosophy of science, are not applicable to biology. However, there are also 
models elaborated on the basis of detailed analyses of explanatory practices in biology 
101 
 
which may be considered against our case of immune recognition. One of the models of 
explanatory reduction that seems to reflect our own approach to immune recognition is the 
model by Sahotra Sarkar. As we have already mentioned, he distinguishes between three 
criteria of reductionist explanations (table 2). These criteria may serve as the basis for 
classification of various types of reduction and include fundamentalism, abstract hierarchy 
and spatial hierarchy (1998, pp. 43-44).  
 Fundamentalism is an idea that an explanation of a systemic feature requires 
making reference to factors that belong to a different realm. This criterion seems be 
satisfied in the case of our account of immune recognition. We invoked different realms to 
explain immune system recognition. Firstly, we made reference to the realm of interacting 
modules. The realm of interaction modules includes dynamic aggregates of cells and 
molecules whose behavior depends on structural features of intestinal microbes, chemical 
and physical conditions in the lumen and the state of the host. Secondly, we made 
reference to the realm of interacting cells and molecules. For example, we pointed out that 
the module involved in detection of the microbial composition in the gut is constituted by a 
pattern of activation of PRRs located on the apical surface of IECs. It also includes 
signaling pathways downstream of these PRRs and a particular repertoire of cytokines and 
chemokines released by IECs as a result of the activation of these pathways.     
    The second criterion of a reductionist explanation by Sarkar is abstract hierarchy. 
Abstract hierarchy means that a system under consideration consists of levels that can be 
distinguished on the basis of some independent principle. From the point of view of this 
principle, reductionist explanation appeals only to the entities and properties at the lower 
level. Again, this criterion also appears to be satisfied by our explanation of the recognition. 
We have argued that immune recognition involves three distinct levels: the level of 
molecules (receptors, signaling molecules and the like), the level of functional modules 
(the level of virulence factors detectors) and the level of recognition itself (decision-
making level determining the type of immune response) (Figure 6).  
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 Figure 6. Hierarchical architecture of immune recognition.  
 
Each level consists of elements that respond to a different type of environmental stimuli. 
Therefore, a response to a given type of stimulus can be considered as an independent 
principle on the basis of which we distinguish between these levels. The level of 
recognition itself responds to various forms and degrees of pathogenicity of a microbe, the 
level of functional modules responds to different kinds of pathogenicity-making factors 
and the level of interaction molecules responds to biochemical and cellular signals in the 
immediate environment of the constituent cells and molecules of the immune recognition 
process.  
 In order to explain the activity at each level we have referred to the elements and 
their properties at the lower level exclusively. We have appealed to the interaction between 
detection modules (level number 2) to explain immune recognition itself (level number 3) 
and we have appealed to complex interaction between cells and molecules (level number 1) 
to explain the interaction between the modules (level number 2). Even though our list of 
detection modules may not be complete (we predict that some, yet undiscovered modules 
will be found in the course of the experimental work in immunology), we have taken for 
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granted that a complete list of modules and complete understanding of their causal 
interplay would make up complete knowledge about immune recognition in the gut.  
 How can we know that complete understanding of detection modules can provide 
explanation of immune recognition? This hypothesis cannot be based on empirical 
evidence because, as we have mentioned, the list of detection modules may be incomplete. 
It is based on a rational argument. Pathogenicity of a microbe depends on a finite number 
of intrinsic and extrinsic factors (we call them “pathogenicity-making factors”). Detection 
of at least some of these factors is absolutely necessary to protect the host. It is also 
sufficient because nothing else than pathogenicity making factors is informative about 
disease causing power of a microbe.  
 Hence, the immune recognition has been explained in terms of modules that detect 
pathogenicity-making factors. The activity of the modules and relationships between them 
have been explained, in turn, in terms of lower level molecular and cellular parts and 
interactions between them. For example, module involved in detection of the localization 
of a microbe relative to the epithelium has been explained in terms of polarization of IECs. 
This polarization allows divergent effects of the ligation of apical and basolateral PRRs. As 
an example of our explanation of an interplay between modules we can give the account of 
the interaction between the module involved in detection of structural features of a microbe 
and the one engaged in detection of microbial composition in the lumen. This relationship 
was explain purely cellular and molecular terms as a process of conditioning of DCs by 
IEC-derived factors.      
 The third criterion of a reductionist explanation distinguished by Sarkar is spatial 
hierarchy. Spatial hierarchy refers to the physical organization of a system, such that each 
level consists of constituent parts of the higher level. This criterion also seems to be 
satisfied by our explanation of immune recognition because each level in the hierarchical 
architecture of immune recognition consists of parts of the higher level (Figure 6). 
Detection modules and their interactions are parts of the immune recognition process. Cells 
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and molecules at the lower level are parts of detection modules and their interactions and 
thus they are also parts of the immune recognition process itself.    
 As one can see, our explanation of immune recognition satisfies criteria of a 
reductionist explanation formulated by Sarkar. Thus, at least from his perspective, our 
explanation of immune recognition is reductive. However, one should note that on the 
grounds of Sarkar’s model of reduction there may be different degrees in which criteria are 
satisfied and therefore there may be different strengths of a reductionist explanation itself 
(1998).  
    Apart from Sarkar’s model of reduction, we have also mentioned Kenneth Waters’ 
model of reduction as apparently applicable to the systems level account of immune 
recognition. We have also mentioned that Waters does not explicitly provide a model of 
reduction. Instead, his notion of reduction can be reconstructed on the basis of his analysis 
of the relationship between classical genetics and molecular genetics (Waters 1990; 1994; 
2004). Roughly, reductionist explanation for Waters requires identification of a 
phenomenon with something more fundamental. In addition, there must be a conceptual 
link between higher level understanding of the phenomenon and lower-level understanding 
of this phenomenon. 
    How are these two reductionist conditions satisfied by our explanation of immune 
recognition? First of all, we have indeed identified immune recognition with something 
more fundamental. We took it for granted that immune recognition is nothing but a 
complex molecular and cellular interaction that determines an immune response. By no 
means immune recognition was considered as a distinct process, independent from the 
lower level interactions. In addition, we have assumed that there is a strong conceptual link 
between the immune recognition, traditionally understood, and the analyzed network of 
interacting cells and molecules. Both, the idea of immune recognition and the network of 
underlying cells and molecules are assumed to refer to the very same process of 
determination of an immune response. We have modified the traditional concept of 
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immune recognition by revealing that the process involves not only the immune system 
(traditionally understood as a system of cells and molecules of hematopoietic origin) but 
also other bodily systems and enteric bacteria. However, we have preserved the notion 
according to which immune recognition is the process that determines an immune response.       
 All things considered, our explanation of immune recognition appears to satisfy 
conditions of reductionist explanation formulated by Sarkar and Waters. In the remaining 
part of the thesis we make reference to one of the most powerful arguments against 
reductionism to see how our account of immune recognition can possibly sustain it.  
 
Multiple realizability argument against reduction  
Any defense of reductionist approach must respond to antireductionist arguments. We 
focus here on one of the most powerful of them, the so called “multiple realizability 
argument”. This argument is largely responsible for the current antireductionist consensus 
in philosophy of biology (Sober 1999, p. 542). It starts with the observation that the same 
type of higher level biological process can be realized by many different alternative 
molecular and cellular level processes. If this is the case, the higher level process cannot be 
explained reductively in terms of a single kind of molecular and cellular realization. 
Instead, it must be explained in terms of a disjunction of alternative realizations that can 
support the process. This, however may be impossible to achieve because the list of 
alternative realizations of a given process may be very long. The classical example is pain 
(Putnam 1967). Pain is irreducible to a pattern of neural activation because different 
patterns of neural (and, possibly, non-neural) activation can support it. (It is empirically 
proved that pain may be realized by many different neural patterns in different species, in 
different individuals and even in the same individual in two different moments of time). If 
pain is multiple realizable in this sense, its reduction requires making reference to all its 
possible realizations. This, however, may be difficult to achieve in practice because 
realization of pain is not even well described for a single species.  
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 As we have already mentioned in chapter 2, multiple realizability argument against 
theory reduction was originally formulated by Putnam and Fodor in the context of 
philosophy of mind (Putnam 1975a; Fodor 1974). We focus here on the Fodor’s 
presentation of this argument. He appeals to multiple realizability to argue against many 
physicalists that theories formulated within special sciences are irreducible to physical 
theories.  
 Fodor considers reduction in the sense defined by Nagel. He assumes that reduction 
is primarily a relationship between laws and that it requires each predicate of the reduced 
theory to be either included in the vocabulary of the reducing theory or connected with the 
vocabulary of the reducing theory by means of bridge principles (he calls them “bridge 
laws”). Bridge laws are defined by Fodor as expressions of identities between events 
(Fodor 1974, p. 100). He also emphasizes that predicates of the reduced and the reducing 
theory must refer to the same things (Fodor 1974, p. 99). Therefore, he finds it legitimate 
to consider bridge laws as statements expressing co-reference of predicates of the reduced 
and the reducing theories.  
 The central assumption of theory reduction of special sciences is that each natural 
kind predicate in a special science is co-extensional with a predicate in the physical science. 
However, according to Fodor, predicates of special sciences are rarely co-extensional with 
single predicates of physical sciences. Instead, they are co-extensional with many 
alternative predicates of the physical science. This observation implies that bridge 
principles must establish connections not between single predicates (one from the special 
science and the other from the physical science), but instead link predicates of a special 
science to a wild disjunction of predicates of the physical science. This, in turn, suggests 
that there is no type-type correlation between a special science and the physical science.  
 One could argue that the failure of type-type correlation does not undermine 
reduction of a special science to the physical science. Instead it shows that the description 
in the physical science can be reduced to many alternative descriptions in the physical 
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science. However, as we have mentioned, reduction for Fodor is a relationship between 
laws. And the laws are assumed to involve natural kind predicates. Natural kind predicates 
in special sciences do not correspond to natural kind predicates in the physical science. 
Instead they correspond to a disjunction of natural kind predicates in the physical science, 
which by themselves, are not natural kinds. All of this demonstrates that laws of special 
sciences are irreducible to laws of physics. 
 As one can see, central for the multiple realizability argument by Fodor is the 
observation that a predicate term in the special science is co-extensional with many 
alternative predicates of the physical science. This observation is based on the fact that 
there are many generalizations formulated within special sciences that cannot be 
formulated in terms of the lower-level physical science. In fact, one of the reasons why 
special sciences are still there is that they look for generalizations that cannot be 
formulated in physical terms because of their heterogeneity at the physical level (Fodor 
1974, p. 103). Fodor gives an example from the field of economics to illustrate this point; a 
law of economics cannot be reduced to a law of physics because many different alternative 
physical entities and relationships between these entities support an economical law. This 
implies that each predicate of economics is co-extensional with a wild disjunction of 
physical predicates (Fodor 1974, p. 103-104).      
 Multiple realizability argument in the context of philosophy of biology has been 
first formulated by David Hull. Hull used this argument to argue that classical genetics is 
irreducible to molecular genetics. He pointed out that the relationships between predicate 
terms in classical genetics and molecular genetics are not simple one-one relationships 
(Hull 1974, pp. 37-39). First of all, a single predicate term in classical biology often does 
not correspond to a single predicate in molecular genetics. Instead, it corresponds to a 
description of many alternative molecular mechanisms. For example, it is impossible to 
find a single predicate in molecular genetics that could play the role of the term 
“dominance” in classical genetics. Instead, conceptual counterparts of this term in 
108 
 
molecular genetics would be complex descriptions of various mechanisms. On the other 
hand, a single predicate term in molecular biology can be linked to many predicate terms in 
classical biology. For example, the term “enzyme-synthesizing system” would have to be 
characterized by many different predicates of classical genetics (cf. Schaffner 1976, p. 
619). These considerations lead Hull to conclude that it is practically impossible to 
establish reductive functions (bridge principles) that could link vocabularies of the 
classical genetics and molecular genetics. This, in turn, implies that it is impossible to 
derive generalizations of classical genetics from molecular genetics (Hull 1974, pp. 37-39). 
All things considered, the relationship between classical genetics and molecular genetics 
must be considered as a case of theory replacement rather than reduction.   
 Philip Kitcher also makes reference to the multiple realizability argument in the 
context of the debate about reduction in classical genetics. He follows Nagel and Schaffer 
claiming that reduction of classical genetics to molecular genetics requires laws of the 
former to be derivable from the latter. He also assumes that this derivation requires bridge 
principles linking vocabularies of molecular genetics and classical genetics. Kitcher 
considers the example of “gene” to show that bridge principles connecting vocabularies of 
these two versions of genetics are not forthcoming. He points out that the central notion of 
classical genetics, that is the notion of gene, cannot be reformulated in the language of 
molecular genetics. It is because there is a great variety of alternative molecular structures 
and complex molecular processes (some of the unknown) that could be considered as 
equivalent to the concept of gene in classical genetics (Kitcher 1984).  
 Kitcher further argues that even if it was possible to reconcile the vocabularies of 
the classical genetics and molecular genetics by making reference to a long disjunction of 
molecular processes that realize gene in the sense of classical genetics, it would be 
impossible to derive laws about gene transmission from molecular genetics. This 
observation is reminiscent of the Fodor’s argument for the autonomy of special sciences 
discussed above.  
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 Even though the above versions of the multiple realizable argument have been 
formulated to undermine theory reduction specifically, they might be modified to serve as 
cases against other models of reduction. (This point has already been made by Fodor 1974, 
p. 114). In particular, multiple realizability argument can be used against different versions 
of explanatory reduction. Explanatory reduction says, among other things, that a complex 
biological process can be explained in terms of its constituents and their interactions. If 
many types of constituents and their interactions can support the same type of higher level 
process, reduction of this process may be difficult to achieve because of the necessity of 
making reference to all the alternative types of underlying constituents and their 
interactions.  
 The antireductionist argument seems to threaten our explanation of immune 
recognition. If the same type of immune recognition can be implemented by many 
alternative cellular and molecular level processes, it is a mistake to claim that the 
recognition reduces to such and such molecular and cellular level process. Instead, it is 
necessary to make reference to all possible molecular and cellular level processes that can 
support this kind of recognition. In other words, if immune recognition is multiple 
realizable and if reduction is an explanation by identification, it cannot be identified with 
any single molecular and cellular level process. This could not be a problem if a given type 
of immune recognition had few possible realizations. However, if the number of possible 
molecular and cellular level realizations of immune recognition is very big, reduction may 
be practically unachievable. Now, we try to estimate the number of possible realizations 
for a given type of immune recognition. 
 
Immune system recognition is multiple realizable 
Multiple realizability argument can be used as an argument against reduction of those 
higher level processes that are constituted by many alternative lower level processes. There 
are reasons to believe that immune recognition is multiple realizable in this sense. Given 
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the complexity and the number of constituent molecules and cells involved in the 
recognition, it is highly unlikely that their exact dynamic configuration could ever be 
reproduced even in the same individual. This observation is trivially true and does not 
require any evidence. No two instances of immune recognition are the same because they 
always involve different microbes, different initial number of immune and non-immune 
cells, different chemical and physical environment in the gut, different composition of the 
gut microbes and so on. Also the exact mechanism of immune recognition of a given type 
may vary depending on the available resources of an individual. For example, we have 
already mentioned that there is evidence showing that deficiencies in the innate immune 
recognition system can be compensated by the adaptive immunity. 
 One obvious manifestation of multiple realizability is robustness
2
. Robustness is the 
ability of a process to maintain performance despite perturbations at the molecular level. 
(Alon et al. 1999; Kitano 2004; Kitano 2007; Stelling et al. 2004; Wagner 2005). 
Robustness is a feature of most biological processes. For example, it is estimated that 
single deletion of 80% of genes in yeast do not affect the overall viability of the organism 
(Cornish-Bowden 2004, p. 715). This property is often ascribed not only to biological 
processes but also to biological functions, systems, states, reactions, modules, pathways, 
traits and other features (Kitano 2004).  
 From the point of view of complex biological processes, robustness is a feature that 
allows these processes to retain their functional identities despite radical changes at the 
molecular level. It is important to realize that molecular perturbations may lead to radical 
changes in the underlying mechanism while leaving the higher level function intact. One 
example of such change is a diauxic shift, a change from anaerobic to aerobic respiration  
                                                          
2
 It is interesting to note that Wimsatt refers to robustness in the above sense as “dynamical autonomy” and 
considers it as an instance of multiple realizability (Wimsatt 1994, p. 217-220). (What he calls “robustness”, 
is something different; it is the feature of properties, objects or states of affairs that allows multiple, 
independent means of cognitive access). 
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(cf. Kitano 2004, p. 828). A bacterium can maintain respiration process despite radical 
changes in the environment by changing the supporting molecular level mechanism.   
 Immune recognition is also robust. Mutations in genes coding for receptors 
involved in detection of microbial structural motifs may not affect the capacity of the 
system to distinguish pathogenic and nonpathogenic agents. We have already made 
reference to strong scientific evidence showing that single molecular or cellular defect is 
not sufficient to perturb accuracy of the immune recognition process. The best known 
example is that of NOD2, specialized in detection of PGN. Mutations in the gene coding 
for NOD2, even though alter the function of the receptor do not lead to immune 
misrecognition unless they are accompanied by other organic or environmental defects 
(Cho and Abraham 2007). NOD2 knockout mice do not have any phenotypic defects. The 
same is true about other single environmental defects. Alterations in the integrity of 
epithelial cell barrier in the intestine lead to IBD only in the minority of cases (May et al. 
1993). Thus even though one could expect that mutation of a crucial receptor gene or a 
defect in the integrity of the epithelial surface would automatically make the immune 
system unable to distinguish between pathogenic and commensal agents, this does not have 
to be the case. For more examples of studies showing that the mucosal immune system 
does not lose its capacity to produce suitable responses despite serious defects at the 
molecular and cellular levels compare our discussion on IBD in the first part of the thesis. 
 
Systems level understanding of immune recognition does not reduce to understanding 
of the actual lower level processes. 
As one can see, there is strong body of evidence showing that the same type of immune 
recognition can be realized by almost infinitely many alternative molecular and cellular 
level processes. This fundamental fact suggests that systems level understanding of 
immune recognition cannot be reduced in practice to a representation of the actual 
molecular and cellular level process. In other words, it seems impossible to explain 
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immune recognition in terms of the genuine interaction between cells and molecules 
because different types of interactions can support the same type of recognition.   
     Mark Bedau discussed the problem of irreducibility in practice in a number of 
papers (1997; 2002; 2008). He distinguished a class of macro-level properties that cannot 
be explained in terms of micro-level properties because these micro-level properties are 
involved in a complex network of interactions. According to Bedau, knowledge about the 
macro-level properties could be derived, at least in principle, from the knowledge about the 
underlying micro-level properties, but given the complexity of the micro-level, the 
derivation would be extremely complex (Bedau 2002; 2008, p. 445). He uses the concept 
of explanatory incompressibility to express this thought. Incompressibility is a feature of 
reductive explanations that require detailed analysis of the microcausal web and cannot be 
replaced by simpler short-cut explanations (Bedau 2008). Since epistemic reduction 
requires identification of a macro-level property with some micro-level properties the 
complexity of the micro-level properties may exclude the possibility of reduction. This 
epistemic irreducibility, in turn, grants the macro-level properties apparent epistemic 
autonomy referred to as “weak emergence” (2002). 
 One of the central assumptions by Bedau is that there are macro-level properties, 
derivation of knowledge of which must involve representations whose complexities mirror 
the actual complexities at the lower-level. For example, in the context of simulations that 
could be used to facilitate derivation of the knowledge of macro-level properties from the 
knowledge of micro-level properties; he writes “It is an especially “long-winded” 
derivation because it mirrors each individual step in the system’s micro-level causal 
dynamics” (Bedau 2002). He contrasts such derivations with “short-cut” (or compressible) 
derivations that, he admits, are very frequent in science.  
 One could argue that there is no evidence for the first kind of derivations in biology. 
Derivation of knowledge of macro-level properties from the knowledge of micro-level 
properties (in some informal sense of derivation) is a standard explanatory procedure in 
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immunology as well in medicine and does not involve representations reflecting the actual 
complexity at the micro-level. A doctor can infer the course of a complex macro-level 
pathology by performing a simple genetic test even though the pathology is realized by 
extremely complex lower level process. One of the goals of clinical immunology is to 
develop methods that allow acquisition of accurate knowledge about complex diseases 
(their causal powers) on the basis of simple, uninvasive molecular tests.  
 On the other hand, however, it is important to realize that standard derivations of 
knowledge about macro-properties in biology and immunology have limited accuracy. It is 
most probably because they are based on a fragmentary representation of the micro-level. 
There are reasons to believe that reductionist explanations involving representations 
mirroring the actual complexity at the lower level would be much more accurate. This is 
why systems immunologists look for integration of knowledge about all molecular and 
cellular parts and their interactions: “A key aim of postgenomic biomedical research is to 
systematically catalogue all molecules and their interactions within a living cell. There is a 
clear need to understand how these molecules and the interactions between them determine 
the function of this enormously complex machinery, both in isolation and when surrounded 
by other cells” (Barabasi and Oltivai 2004). All things considered, we agree with Bedau 
that full knowledge about the macro-facts requires full knowledge about micro-facts and 
the complexity of the latter is directly proportional to the complexity of the micro-facts and 
their relationships. Knowledge about macro-facts standardly acquired in biology on the 
basis of fragmentary knowledge about micro-facts is also often fragmentary and limited in 
scope.  
    Even though the primary concern of Bedau is reducibility of those macro-properties 
that are complex at the micro-level, his conclusions can be extended to include also 
multiple realizable macro-level properties. Even if it was possible in practice to derive 
knowledge about certain macro-level properties on the basis of the knowledge about 
micro-level interactions, knowledge about the macro-level properties could be irreducible 
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to the knowledge about lower-level interactions because of the number of possible 
alternative lower-level realizations.  
This is exactly the problem we are facing while discussing multiple realizability of 
immune recognition. Empirical evidence for the robustness of the recognition and the 
observation that the same type of recognition can be implemented by structurally diverse 
systems prevent from reducing knowledge about immune recognition to only one type of 
molecular and cellular level interaction. One would have to make reference to all possible 
lower level interactions to perform this kind of reduction successfully. This is achievable 
only in principle but not in practice (cf. the discussion on the distinction between 
reducibility in principle and in practice in: Bedau 2008, p. 449).   
    
Systems level understanding of immune recognition reduces to an approximation of 
the lower level processes 
Throughout this thesis we have argued that systems level understanding of immune 
recognition is in a sense reducible. However, multiple realizability argument seems to deny 
this claim. It seems to demonstrate that systems level understanding of immune recognition 
is at best reducible in principle but not in practice to the molecular and cellular knowledge 
of the process. Indeed, there seems to be no way out from the evidence showing that 
different molecular and cellular level explanations may apply to the same type of immune 
recognition.  
 However, one should note that multiple realizability argument undermines the 
possibility of reducing higher level representation of a given type of process to the lower 
level representation of the actual process. It takes it for granted that reductionist 
explanation must reflect, like a mirror, the exact configuration of the constituent elements 
of a given process. This however, rarely occurs in biology.  
 If researches sought to explain a complex process in terms of its actual components 
they would end up with an explanation applicable to a single occurrence of the process. 
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They would have to note for example, that a molecule X located at a position Y at time t is 
responding to a molecule Z and so on. Their aim, instead, is to formulate explanations that 
are applicable to possibly large number of molecular and cellular cases. Having this goal in 
mind they have to abstract from many lower level idiosyncrasies and focus on those lower 
level features that are shared by many members of a given biological category. 
 In order to formulate reductionist generalizations applicable to a possibly large 
number of cases, researchers use approximations. Instead of trying to reproduce bit by bit 
the exact topology, shape and movement of each and every constituent molecule and cell 
of a given process, they sketch a simplified picture of the components and their 
interactions and use it further as a basis for prediction and derivation of knowledge about 
higher level processes. Even those biologists who aspire to complete knowledge about all 
cellular and molecular components of a process do not mean the actual cellular and 
molecular components that can be found in each and every individual. Instead they refine 
already existing approximation to draw a picture of lower level interactions that comes 
closer to the actual complexity at the lower level in each member of a given category. All 
in all, approximations serve as tools helping to deal with multiple realizability. They allow 
to omit idiosyncrasies of a particular data sample. 
    What are approximations though? Approximations can be defined simply as 
“inexact description of a target system” (Norton, unpubl.). The description of lower level 
processes constituting the process of recognition in the first part of the thesis counts as 
approximation because it is inexact, that is, it does not include all the elements and 
interactions involved in the recognition and it does not map accurately the exact dynamics 
and structure of the actual processes.  
 Sarkar distinguishes between different types of approximations in biology on the 
basis of several different criteria. Particularly important from the point of view of our 
analysis is a distinction between corrigible, incorrigible in practice and incorrigible in 
principle approximations  (1998, p. 49). As we have already mentioned, one of the central 
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assumptions of the systems biology approach in immunology is that standard lower level 
approximations in immunology will be corrected if more molecular and cellular details will 
be included in the explanation. Ideally, number of molecular details should reflect the 
actual complexity at the lower level. For the reasons we have mentioned in the previous 
section, the complete correction of an approximation would narrow the scope of an 
explanation to a single case. Thus, approximations seem to be inevitably embedded in 
immunological explanations, whether systemic or molecular (cf. Sarkar 1998, pp. 48-52). 
According to Rosenberg, exceptionless laws apply only to the most fundamental level and 
therefore generalizations at the higher levels have unavoidably approximate character 
(1994, p. 37).  
 Another important distinction by Sarkar is that between the estimable, not estimable 
in practice and not estimable in principle effects of approximation. Since the 
approximations involved in the immunological explanations are mostly implicit, their 
effects are rarely estimated. It is not even clear how these effects could be measured given 
that they are inseparately intertwined with scientific explanation (cf. Wimsatt 2007a, pp. 
16-17).  
All things considered, realization that lower level explanations in biology are 
doomed to refer to lower level approximations rather than representations of the actual 
goings on suggests that our own explanation of immune recognition does not reduce to the 
lower level representation of the lower level processes but to the approximation of the 
latter.  
     
Is the reduction to approximation a reduction still? 
The above analysis lead us to conclude that systems level understanding of immune 
recognition does not reduce to a description in terms of actual interaction between 
molecular and cellular parts but rather the approximation of this interaction. However, 
there is a problem of whether reduction to approximation can be considered reduction.   
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   Think about the following argument by John Dupré. He argues that individuals that 
are postulated by some higher level theory are not identical to those that are postulated by 
the lower level theory. He considers an ecological model, in which foxes are represented as 
having propensities to eat hares. However, on the grounds of a lower level analysis the 
same individuals may be represented differently, as for example eating in some situations 
hares, in other situations rabbits. Similarly, an idealized rabbit that is a subject of studies 
by physiology is a different individual than an idealized rabbit that is a pray for an 
idealized fox that is a subject of studies by ecology. Thus, a defining features ascribed to 
certain individuals at the higher level may not be exactly the ones that are ascribed at the 
lower level. This is considered by Dupré as the evidence that reductionism of the higher 
level to the lower level fails (Dupré 1993, p. 116).  
We face similar problem in the case of immune recognition. Properties of 
molecular and cellular constituents of immune recognition may look differently when 
perceived from the immune system recognition level perspective and when studied 
independently from molecular or cellular one. We suggest that the molecular and cellular 
properties as postulated by the systems level of understanding are approximations of those 
that could be discovered by molecular biology or cellular biology at the lower level. This, 
in turn lead us to conclude the systems level understanding of immune recognition reduces 
to these approximations.  
 A detailed lower level reconstruction of the interactions between cells and 
molecules at the mucosal tissues might not allow one to isolate immune recognition as a 
distinct process. It is because distinct levels of analysis focus on different kinds of 
properties (Dupré 1993). Properties that are visible for immunology are isolated on the 
basis of some broader theoretical framework; “the properties of concern are determined by 
the macrotheory we are trying to construct” (Dupré 1993, p. 116). For example, immune 
recognition process is isolated as a distinct process on the grounds of the cognitive 
paradigm that perceives the immune system as a cognitive system. For a competitive 
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framework, for example of the one that considers the relationship between microbes and 
the immune system in terms of a homeostatic balance, immune recognition might not be 
isolated as a distinct process.   
    All things considered, systems level understanding of immune recognition can be 
considered as reducible to lower level approximations. These approximations however, are 
themselves formulated from the perspective of the broader theoretical framework at the 
higher level. Approximations of the same lower level phenomena but formulated from the 
lower level perspective are different. Whether this weakened version of reduction to 
approximations formulated from the higher level point of view is a genuine reduction is an 
open question and depends on the employed notion of reduction.  
    
Conclusions 
In the first two parts of the thesis we argued that the classical view of immune recognition 
fails to explain how the mucosal immune system manages to produce accurate responses to 
pathogenic and non-pathogenic microbes. According to the classical view, pathogen/non-
pathogen discrimination is performed by single types of cells and molecules. However, 
there is evidence enough to conclude that immune recognition is performed collectively by 
many different types of cells and molecules. Indeed it is the job of the immune system as a 
system to design responses in accordance with disease causing powers of microbes. From 
this perspective, all the past research projects aiming to explain how DCs, macrophages, 
TLR4s or other single units discriminate between pathogenic and nonpathogenic microbes 
turn out to be based on wrong assumptions.   
Recent studies of the immune system help to realize that the systemic recognition 
involves specialized detection modules engaged in processing information about factors 
that influence disease causing power of intestinal microbes. Understanding immune 
recognition requires analysis of these functional modules and their complex interactions.  
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 Since immune recognition appears to be modular and performed collectively by 
many different types of cells of molecules, we suggest that a systems biology approach is 
needed to explain the recognition. Systems biology approach is often contrasted with a 
reductionist approach. However, these two approaches can be reconciled if reduction is 
understood as an explanation in terms of complex interactions between constituent 
molecular and cellular parts. This notion of reduction has been elaborated in philosophical 
circles for the last several decades and differs from the similar notion in biology.  
Reductionist approaches of various sorts are confronted with a powerful 
antireductionist argument, the so called “multiple realizability argument”. According to 
this argument, a process of a given type cannot be reduced to a given type of lower-level 
process if it can be realized by many different types of lower level processes. One has to 
make reference to a disjunction of the alternative types of lower level processes that realize 
a higher level process to reductively explain this higher level process. This kind of 
explanation may not be available if the number of possible realizations of the higher level 
process is very big.     
Immune recognition is no doubt multiple realizable. Each instance of immune 
recognition may involve different lower level interactions. However this does not mean 
that the systemic explanation of this process is not reductive. Quite the contrary, it reduces 
to a single approximation of many alternative types of lower level processes that realize 
the recognition. Indeed, multiple realizability argument is based on the assumption that 
reduction requires making reference to the exact representation of lower level processes. 
However, researches tend to refer to approximations of these processes. Lower level 
approximations differ from the exact lower level representations in that they abstract from 
molecular idiosyncrasies and focus on molecular features that are shared by many different 
instances of lower level realizations of a given process. Some could argue that reduction to 
approximation is not a real reduction. Whether reduction to approximation can be 
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considered as real reduction is an open question and the answer seems to depend on the 
exact requirements one imposes on reduction.  
All the analysis of systems level understanding of immune recognition allows one 
to answer the initial question about the sense of reduction involved in our explanation of 
immune recognition. Systems level understanding of immune recognition is reducible to 
approximation of the lower level processes. It is however irreducible to representation of 
the actual lower level processes.   
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Supplement 1 
Classical paradigm of immune recognition (examples) 
A theory according to which single types of cells and molecules can discriminate between 
pathogenic and nonpathogenic agents was originally formulated as a good reflection of 
available data. However, now, in the light of new data, there is a discrepancy between the 
paradigm and available evidence. The table quotes some recently published, important 
immunological papers in order to show that the paradigm according to which single types 
of cells and molecules discriminate between pathogenic and nonpathogenic agents is still 
maintained.  
 
Nr Paradigmatic 
pathogen 
recognizing 
cells and 
molecules 
Corresponding reference 
1 Epithelial cells “[Intestinal epithelial cells] IECs emerge as sentinel cells that are 
not only able to discriminate between 'friends' (the commensal 
microorganisms) and 'foes' (the pathogens) but are also able to 
translate this recognition process into signals to the mucosal innate 
immune system that tip the balance towards tolerance in the 
presence of commensal microorganisms and inflammation aimed 
at microbial destruction in the presence of pathogens.” (Sansonetti 
2004, p. 962). “IECs show qualitatively distinct responsiveness to 
commensal and pathogenic bacteria species.” (Coombes and 
Powrie 2008, p. 440). 
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2 Macrophages “To eliminate pathogens macrophages, like other cells from the 
immune system, need to be able to distinguish self from non-self.” 
(Heinsbroek and Gordon 2007, p. 7) 
“As sentinels of the immune system, macrophages must be able to 
determine the nature and scope of microbial threats to mount 
appropriate transcriptional responses. Macrophages need to 
discriminate not only viral from bacterial infection, but also 
extracellular and possibly killed microbes from intracellular and 
replicating pathogens (Leber et al. 2008). 
3 Dendritic cells “Dendritic cells recognize pathogens through receptors that 'see' 
common determinants found on pathogens. The best characterized 
of these receptors are the Toll-like receptors. After recognizing a 
pathogen, dendritic cells migrate to the lymphoid organs, where 
they interact with T cells, transmitting information about the type 
of infection encountered and inducing a T-cell response.” (Lehar 
and Bevan 2004, p.150). 
“Dendritic cells reside in most peripheral tissues, where they 
monitor the tissue environment for the presence of pathogens by 
using various PRRs. When a pathogen is encountered by a 
dendritic cell, it is taken up by phagocytosis, and its protein 
constituents are processed into antigenic peptides, which are 
presented at the cell surface by MHC class I and/or class II 
molecules.” (Medzhitov et a1. 2007, p. 823). 
4 Neutrophils “Until recently, little was known about the ways in which 
neutrophils and macrophages, the major players in innate 
immunity, recognized C.albicans as a pathogenic microorganism, 
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or how the fungal-leukocyte interaction triggers an inflammatory 
response” (Netea et al. 2008, p. 67).      
5 TLRs “Toll-like receptors (TLRs) are the archetypal pattern recognition 
receptors (PRRs) envisioned by as innate sensors of pathogen 
attack and host triggers of an adaptive immune response.” (Kirk 
and Bazan 2005, p. 347) 
 “Paradoxically, Toll-like receptors (TLR) control the mucosal 
defense against pathogens, even though the TLR recognize 
conserved molecules like LPS, which are shared between 
pathogens and commensals. This study proposes a mechanism of 
pathogen-specific mucosal TLR4 activation, involving adhesive 
ligands and their host cell receptors... TLR4 may be engaged 
specifically by pathogens, when the proper cell surface receptors 
are engaged by virulence ligands... The present study used 
P fimbriated E. coli to investigate how the TLR4 response can 
distinguish pathogenic from commensal strains and how the 
downstream signaling pathways maintain pathogen specificity.” 
(Fischer et al. 2006, pp 267-268). 
6 NLRs “Cytosolic recognition of microbial factors by NLR proteins 
appears to be one mechanism whereby the innate immune system 
is able to discriminate between pathogenic bacteria ('foe') and 
commensal ('friendly') members of the host microflora”. 
(Kaparakis 2007, p. 395). 
7 Antigen 
receptors of B-
cells and T-
”Antigen receptors are clonally distributed on T and B 
lymphocytes, which allows clonal selection of pathogen-specific 
receptors and is the basis for immunological memory. (That is, 
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cells  each lymphocyte expresses antigen receptors of a single 
specificity, so only specific populations of lymphocytes are 
selected to expand in response to a pathogen.)” (Medzhitov 2007, 
p. 819). 
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Supplement 2 
 
Philosophy of immunology 
 
Immunology (the study of the immune system) appears to help elucidate many 
philosophical questions regarding complex systems, and traditional philosophical 
discussion on these complex systems can shed light on some fundamental immunological 
issues. Immunologists have always asked and attempted to answer questions that extend 
beyond the empirical data. By doing so, they have pursued philosophy. According to 
Robin George Collingwood, «The theory of science and the theory of history are not parts 
of science and of history; if scientists and historians study these things, they study them not 
in their capacity as scientists or historians, but in their capacity as philosophers» 
(Collingwood, 1933, pp. 1-2). From this point of view, any analysis of theoretical problems 
relevant for immunology concerns the philosophy of immunology. The philosophy of 
immunology in this broad sense has always been a vibrant and potent discipline. Theories 
such as the “germ theory of disease” or “clonal selection theory”, first formulated as 
controversial theoretical hypotheses, established new paradigms, and therefore, became 
important turning points in the history of immunology (Silverstein, 1989). Philosophical 
methods, when applied by theoreticians of immunology, have often been used 
unsystematically and intuitively. However, more recently, a new way of addressing the 
philosophy of immunology is emerging. Immunologists as well as philosophers start 
applying philosophical methods methodically in an attempt to disentangle various 
theoretical problems in immunology. Most of these questions are not only relevant for 
immunology, but they are also interesting to the philosophy of science and of the mind. In 
this particular sense, the philosophy of immunology is a brand new subject. Everybody 
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who joins the field faces an enormous landscape of unexplored theoretical problems that 
have not yet been analyzed. Here, I discuss briefly some of the most original issues that 
have been analyzed recently in this new field of the philosophy of immunology.  
 It seems that the most important topic in the field of the philosophy of immunology 
has been the problem of self/non-self discrimination. Immunology in its present molecular 
and cellular form is a very young science; molecular and cellular immunology was only 
established 60 years ago. Central to this new molecular and cellular paradigm was the 
assumption according to which the immune system has the power to distinguish between 
self and non-self (Burnet and Fenner, 1949). It was assumed that the immune system 
ignores the self and protects an individual from the pathogenic non-self. The immune 
system was perceived as a system that actively defines its identity, its self (Tauber, 2009). 
However, the commonsensical idea, according to which the immune system distinguishes 
and defines between self and non-self, has been challenged by the overwhelming evidence 
showing that the immune system does not simply ignore the self. For example, in the 
intestine, commensal nonpathogenic bacteria, even though incorporated as part of the host 
organism, engage immune receptors and initiate immune system responses (Coombes and 
Maloy, 2007). Moreover, immune autoreactivity, the immune responses against the body’s 
own cells or tissues, has proven to be part of normal, healthy functioning (Schwartz and 
Cohen, 2000). All of this evidence taken together reveals that immune reactivity cannot be 
reduced to the dichotomous recognition of self and non-self. It demonstrates that the initial 
dichotomous model was too simplistic (Tauber, 2009).  
 A number of theoretical models have been proposed to accommodate the theory of 
self/non-self discrimination, with the new experimental data questioning the idea according 
to which the immune system simply ignores the non-self. One interesting theoretical 
solution is the danger model by Polly Matzinger. According to Matzinger, the immune 
system does not have any “interest” in ignoring the self and triggering immune system 
responses towards the non-self. The primary role of the immune system is to protect an 
127 
 
organism from agents that can harm and kill it. Thus, it distinguishes between dangerous 
and non-dangerous agents rather than between the self and non-self. This theoretical 
hypothesis can be tested experimentally. It will prove to be correct if the immune system 
responses end up depending not only on immune receptor recognition per se, but also on 
the so-called “danger signals”. These are signals in the form of molecules that indicate the 
presence of tissue damage (Matzinger, 2002). Another interesting attempt to formulate a 
general theory of when and why immune system responses occur is Pradeu and Carosella’s 
criterion of continuity. The authors begin with the observation that immunogenic or 
tolerogenic responses are induced independently of whether an antigen is part of an 
individual (self) or comes from the outside world (non-self). They argue that immunogenic 
responses are triggered against antigens whose features differ from the ones with which 
immune receptors usually interact (Pradeu and Carosella, 2006).  
Another very important topic in the field of the philosophy of immunology is the 
idea of cognitive immunology. Roughly, the immune system shares many features with the 
nervous system. Crucially, the immune system can be a subject of Pavlovian conditioning 
(Ader and Cohen, 1975). It learns through experience, stores memory, recognizes 
microorganisms and produces responses on the basis of complicated decision-making 
processes (Sotelo, 1999; Hershberg and Efroni, 2001). Perhaps, all of these features would 
not suffice to consider the immune system a cognitive system if it could not search for a 
particular kind of information (Cohen, 1992a). Indeed, the immune system does not only 
cognize whatever it interacts with, but it recognizes it. The prefix “re” means “again”. This 
signifies that the immune system is prepared to encounter a microorganism. Thus, the 
immune system has been suggested to exploit internal images that precede the very act of 
recognition (Cohen, 2000a, pp. 174-175). It is well established that the nervous systems of 
higher animals do not only exploit images of their external environments, but they can also 
represent themselves (Penfield and Boldrey, 1958). The cortex areas that produce these 
internal images are referred to as neurological homunculi. Irun Cohen formulated a theory 
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of immunological homunculus according to which the immune system is capable of 
exploiting images of itself encoded in a distributed network of interacting cells and 
molecules (Cohen, 1992b, 2007). Cohen and his colleagues studied the immunological 
homunculus, the global patterns of autoantibody reactivities, by using an antigen 
microarray chip (Merbl et al., 2007). 
 Another interesting area of research in the field of the philosophy of immunology is 
the problem of immune specificity. It has been assumed at the early stages of the history of 
immunology that immunoglobulins are highly specific in their ability to recognise antigens. 
However, it was recently demonstrated that antibodies are relatively promiscuous. Each 
antibody can potentially bind to more than one antigen. Taking into account this 
promiscuity or degeneracy of immune receptors, it has been proposed that the specificity of 
an antibody is an emergent property arising from the activity of many different cellular and 
molecular factors (Cohen and Harel, 2007). The philosophical idea of emergence behind 
these considerations is close to the one originally formulated by Mark Bedau (1997). 
Namely, discussion on the problem of immune specificity rests on the idea that emergent 
properties are both ontologically autonomous and reducible to the underlying molecular 
and cellular processes (Cohen, 2000a, p. 27-32). Another group of problems are those 
related to the complexity and context-sensitivity of various aspects of immune activity. For 
example, Alfred Tauber has proposed an ecological approach as a conceptual framework 
that helps to understand the principles of immune regulation (Tauber, 2008). This new 
perspective permits the elimination of military metaphors according to which the immune 
system defends the body from pathogenic microorganisms. From an ecological point of 
view, the immune system and microorganisms interact in order to maintain an equilibrium 
whose disruption may lead to pathology. Systems biology appears to provide the 
appropriate tools for studying the immune system within the larger environmental context.  
 Finally, there is a group of theoretical issues related to signaling and information 
processing within the immune system. A good example is the problem of meaning-making 
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in the immune system. There is an analogy between meaning-making in cell 
communication and a similar process in linguistic communication. The same linguistic 
signs can represent different things in different communication contexts. Thus, it is 
necessary to define the context and explain how it contributes to meaning-making 
processes (Neuman, 2004). Apart from the problem of self, context-sensitivity and 
specificity, there are many other theoretical issues in the field of the philosophy of 
immunology. Most of these problems have not yet been explored. One group of such 
unexplored theoretical problems appears to be those related to psychoneuroimmunology, 
the study of the relationship between the nervous system and the immune system.  Strong 
empirical evidence exists to demonstrate a cross-talk between these two systems. The 
activity of the immune system can be modulated by the nervous system and vice versa 
(Ader at al., 2006) Observation, according to which there is a link connecting the mind and 
immunity, has interesting implications for the ontology of the mind. 
Psychoneuroimmunology puts the mind-body problem in a new light. In addition, it helps 
to understand the power of the placebo effect, alternative medicine and faith healing. 
Furthermore, it assists in explaining these allegedly miraculous phenomena in a purely 
naturalistic way.  
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